The team individually and in partnership with a task force headed by the FAA pressed forward for immediate correction of safety problems. AOPA participation will continue until a number of objectives for improving safety and service are attained. On March 27th, methods to re-establish VFR routes for tour flights were identified and targeted for activation by April 3rd. A "zero tolerance" policy toward pilot deviations has been modified. VFR corridors for general use and VFR flyway charting is scheduled to be addressed by the task group in an early April meeting. Issuance of transponder codes at North Las Vegas is being reinstated; first with tour flights to be followed shortly by all users. Means for provision of comparable service to Henderson Airport is being pursued. Pilots are encouraged to utilize a more safe and user friendly airspace system being revived in the Las Vegas area.
It is important to recognize and commend U.S.A.F Air Traffic Controllers at Nellis A.F.B. for their outstanding performance throughout this ordeal. Their acceptance of added workload and cooperative efforts in all areas enhanced safety. Their professional "can-do" spirit provided excellent example and inspiration during a very difficult period.
The situation covered above resulted from apparently an arbitrary act by the ATC facility manager in cancelling pre-arranged (referred to as CANNED) VFR routes through Class B airspace. Evidence supports that FAA evaluators had identified the long used procedure as "illegal" citing separation flaws between the VFR tour flights and IFR departures from McCarran International airport.
"Anticipated" separation and/or waiver for such long utilized and safely functioning procedures was not acknowledged. Ramifications as to impacts resulting from voiding of the routes was either ignored or overlooked. Logical alternative strategy for serving these flights was not provided thus forcing large numbers of high performance commercial flights outside controlled airspace. Widescale mixing of general aviation and these passenger flights occurred within a very confined area. Undesirable factors of congestion and convergence escalated. Removal of the "Canned" VFR routes and issuance of transponder codes further eroded safety due to added frequency congestion and controller and pilot workload during very critical phases of operational needs.
Explanation: During departure climb while challenged with a see-and-avoid situation involving a large number of other flights in a very confined area , at least one cockpit member would be engaged in efforts to secure ATC service. If such could not be attained,the flight then would be forced to circumnavigate Class B under low-lying shelves and rising terrain where limited space allow little if any altitude segregation. Controller reactions under such conditions would tend to divert attention from the radar screen to key-board entries and delivery of transponder codes. Frequency congestion alone would inhibit provision of optimum service to everyone either within or seeking entry into the ATC system.
Concurrently, FAA management imposed a zero tolerance policy toward pilot deviations; noticeably to flights in or near Class B.In short time a highly polarized and emotional atmosphere developed a near complete loss of faith, trust and respect for FAA management and hindered communication and any endeavor to correct or improve upon a myriad of problems.
Dialogue with FAA officials from Washington Headquarters validates strict handling of pilot deviations caused by policy interpretation issued by Flight Standards at that level. Directions regarding application was perceived as removal of ATC managers prerogatives to assess pilot actions or to advise, counsel, or screen in any way such conduct. Some FAA sources verified a perception that common sense application
Of this policy is prohibited. Actions throughout the FAA including Air Traffic and Flight Standards offices however reflect overall more judicious handling of such matters. The Las Vegas Flight Standards Office indcates complete accord with more reasonable and practical management strategy. It should be understood that LAS FSDO does not "push" a "take-no-prisoners" mood.
Specifying safety concerns, AOPA challenged a procedure which required controllers to notify pilots that a deviation was being filed, and demand for their calling a telephone number at the facility.
Although FAA management directives require such notification, discretion is allowed. AOPA recognized situations considered emergency in nature may warrant such alert, however emphasized that for safety reasons minor and inadvertent infractions should not be passed until aircraft were on the ground. Flight Standards authorities concurred with our position and the situation has improved.
Coordination with FAA Headquarters at the Washington level will be needed to standardize and further refine this process.