Safety Hot Spot

Safety Hot Spot Fuel Management — NASA ASRS Reports

Pilots that were involved in a fuel management incident or accident wrote the following reports:

Narrative:

While flying VFR from Prescott, Arizona, to ZZZ, I was PIC of a Cessna 152 that experienced a critical fuel emergency. At three hours 23 minutes total time en route, I was cleared to land for the straight in to Runway 24, approximately nine nm to the east. Shortly thereafter, the engine displayed two successive power surges, both times dropping below 1,000 RPM. It was at this time that I consulted my copilot (also a private pilot) and we decided it would be best to get down as soon as possible. I turned towards XXX squawked 7700 while he declared an emergency with tower. I maneuvered towards the airport and was cleared to land on Runway 22 or Runway 25. I set up for Runway 22 and slipped into land without further incident. After the emergency response team greeted us, much to our surprise, we were informed we had landed at an Air Force base. I taxied off the runway and did not experience any other power losses, however, the tanks were very low. I feel important details to consider include the fact that I was part of a group of aircraft all flying the same route, one of which was also a Cessna 152 which departed roughly 15-20 minutes earlier. Also, this was my first cross-country of this magnitude and I relied too much on the input of the more experienced members of the group when it came to flight planning. This gave me a false sense of security -- 'I should be fine.' they didn't mention a fuel stop. They had done this trip before. Thoughts of this nature clouded my judgment. Additionally, at around three hours of total flight time, I began consulting my copilot and the pilot of the other Cessna 152 on groundspeed, fuel burn, and our ETA. We all agreed that we should be able to make it to our destination with the required 30 minutes of reserve fuel for day VFR flight. Obviously, this was not the case. It was later determined that the Cessna 152 I was flying was burning more than the 6.1 GPH listed in the POH. The aircraft was burning closer to 6.8 GPH.

Narrative:

The winds were forecast 340 degrees at 8 knots at 6000 ft. Based on this, I estimated that my groundspeed would be 97 mph and my time en route would be three hours. As I went along from checkpoint to checkpoint, it became obvious that my ground speed was not as fast as estimated and the flight was taking longer than anticipated. I began to become increasingly concerned about my fuel. I decided that I would deviate from my flight plan and land at ZZZ to get fuel. As I approached ZZZ, I called the FBO and inquired as to whether or not he had fuel, he said no. He told me that the nearest place to get fuel was XXX or YYY (I misunderstood him to say ZZZ or YYY). I still believed I had enough fuel to get to ZZZ and since it was my original destination anyway, I rationalized that I should simply continue on to ZZZ. As I neared ZZZ, approximately 7 miles out at 6500 ft I ran out of fuel. I could see the airport but didn't believe I could reach it. I set up a 65-knot glide and started going through my checks. Since I knew that the problem was fuel starvation, I also knew that there was precious little I could do other than try to make the airport and keep an eye out for alternative landing spots in case I couldn't make the airport. At 2500 ft it was obvious that I would not make the airport so I headed toward a field I had picked out then called a pilot I heard talking on the radio and asked him to inform someone that I would be going down a few miles east of ZZZ airport in a field. This allowed me to concentrate on flying the airplane. I flew to the field and once I knew I had the field made, I set up for a soft-field landing. I landed in the field without mishap and rolled to a stop without injury to myself or damage to the aircraft. I consider myself to be extremely lucky! I got out of the airplane and called 911 on my cell phone. The person that answered said he had already heard from the other pilot about the mishap and that someone was on the way out to check on me. In the meantime, I called my departure airport to let them know what happened and ask them to cancel my flight plan. Shortly a policeman showed up and got in touch with the FBO at ZZZ who came out with another pilot to look the situation over. We measured the field and determined that there was plenty of room to take off so I got 10 gallons of fuel and took off. I flew to YYY, topped off the tanks and flew home without further incident. In hindsight it is obvious that I made many bad choices on this flight, the most glaring of which was not to land the airplane when I had an airport in sight (ZZZ) and I knew I was low on fuel. I also realized that if I had made a better flight plan I would have realized that ZZZ didn't sell fuel. I also realized that on a long flight where fuel might become an issue, it might be wise to plan fuel stops on the leg heading into the wind. I believe this because I ran out of fuel on the way to ZZZ but on the return flight I had quarter tanks when I landed at departure airport.

Narrative:

This flight started at Peter O' Knight (TPF) airport, Tampa, Florida The weather conditions were VFR, sunny with few clouds. Start up went well. No problems during preflight, eng start, and inst check. Aircraft had four tanks of full fuel (two tanks per wing), 84 gallons usable: 25 gallons each main and 17 gallons each tip tank. Engine start-up of aircraft was on right tip tank. The fuel selector was not moved from above position during the whole flight. Duration of engine running time was about 65 minutes. Duration of flight from Runway 21, TPF to Runway 14, ZZZ was 55-60 minutes. On final for Runway 14, it was determined to be high for a normal landing. Then an attempt to go around for Runway 14 was started, but the engine failed (the throttle, prop and mixture were all in full position at the time) with 50% of the runway left beneath us. The passenger (a CFI) tried to land the aircraft on the runway. The aircraft touched down with 25% of the runway left in front of it. I then tried to apply the brakes, but they did not stop the aircraft. The aircraft continued down the runway, off into the grass in front of it and through a deep ditch some 50 feet from the end of the runway, at which point the left main landing gear departed the left wing. The nose gear folded underneath the aircraft. The right main landing gear did not break off. Right wing appeared not to be damaged afterwards. The left wing came to rest on the ground still firmly attached to the aircraft, with some skin torn in places. The engine area: prop was bent both sides. No sign of fire or fuel leakage afterwards. No one was hurt during this aircraft incident. I think the cause of this aircraft incident was no fuel to the engine. The right tip tank was too low on fuel (or empty) for it to pump fuel to the engine. The right tip tank only holds 17 gallons usable fuel --enough fuel for a little more than one hour of flight or engine running time. I would have prevented this incident by following the checklist completely and switching tanks from a tip tank used during flight to a main tank for landing. I would in the future, keep track of the time of each tank usage and quantity of fuel in each of them, plus use main tanks for all takeoffs and landings, using tip tanks for cruise flight only.

Supplemental info from acn 604214: a pilot friend of mine asked me to ride along with him in one of his friend's airplane. I am a pilot as well. On final approach, my friend was a bit high and fast. I suggested we do a go around. He agreed and applied full power and raised the nose to a climb attitude. A few seconds later, the engine quit. We landed on the remaining available runway, but stopped a few hundred feet past the end. There were no injuries. The investigation found that the engine quit due to fuel starvation in one of the auxiliary fuel tanks. In looking back at the situation, even though I was not PIC, I believe I should have taken a few moments to familiarize myself with the various systems in the airplane. I believe I should have taken a moment to look at the fuel system, its tanks, and operation to see if it was different from any other aircraft I had been in or flown. The biggest learning experience for me was that, even aircraft of the same make and model can have different types of fuel sys. Whether you are a pilot flying or pilot passenger, you should always try to familiarize yourself with an aircraft you are flying in.

Narrative:

I had a fuel management engine outage in our club tow plane 2000 ft agl 2 miles south of the field. I made a dead-stick landing on Runway 7. The L-19 suffered no damage and performed tow duty for the rest of the day. I think the major issue was that I failed to use the written cockpit checklist for the preflight or for any of the takeoff/letdown ops. I got to the airport a little late and did the preflight/run-up from memory. The written checklist identifies fuel management and emergency procedures, which I did not completely perform -- i.e. although I turned on the electrical fuel pump, I did not switch the fuel selector to the other (full) tank. I assumed I had a mechanical or other failure and focused on performing the engine-out landing. Utilizing checklists, even in relatively simple aircraft, is the known corrective action here.

Narrative:

The flight was planned to be a 400 nm flight in IFR/VFR conditions from BNA to ZZZ. Preflight planning included items from the POH, as well as standard weather briefing. Using a calculated groundspeed of 105 kts, I estimated my time en route to be 3.8 hours. The flight was filed as IFR, but required no alternate as ZZZ was forecast to be VFR. Using a value of 10 GPH fuel burn, and with full tanks (48 gals), I planned on the aircraft being able to fly for 4.8 hrs. I had a requirement of 4.55 hrs, so this flight was also within the planned capabilities of the aircraft. Tanks were filled by the FBO (fuel receipt showing 42 gals) and visually inspected by the pilot (me). I set the clock/timer during taxi. I was cognizant of the need to be conservative with fuel and, again, chose a 70% cruise setting at 2500 rpm and leaned at 8000 ft to achieve an EGT of 1280-1300 degrees. During the flight, I monitored the GPS reported groundspeed to confirm that winds were not stronger than forecast. I observed groundspeed of between 100 and 108 kts during the entire flight (except the climb to 8000 ft). I utilized the GPS advisory messages to switch fuel tanks en route. Immediately prior to the incident, I was descending to 4000 ft and then cancelled IFR after visually recognizing the airport environment. Shortly thereafter, the engine began to falter and the gauge showed low fuel. I then engaged the fuel pump and attempted a restart without success. I switched tanks and attempted a restart with success and continued on the approach. At 2800 feet, the engine began to falter and I noted the other gauge also showed empty. Several things occurred in the next few seconds. I noted that the time on the clock/timer indicated three hours 45 minutes (duration of flight). I noted that there was likely insufficient altitude to glide to the runway. I declared a mayday on 122.8 and 122.5 advising I was experiencing power failure and that I was 3.5 miles east of ZZZ airport and would be making an off-field landing. I turned off the radio, so I would not be distracted. I began a gentle l bank and searched for a suitable landing location. I set for best glide at 70 knots and began an approach, adding flaps as necessary. I awakened the children who were sleeping, and secured them tightly. I completed the landing, shut off master, and exited with passenger. I called 911 from a cell phone to advise local authorities that an off-field landing had occurred and that there were no injuries. The tanks were inspected on the ground, and were found to be dry. The question looms, why did the aircraft burn 12.8 GPH instead of its nominal value of eight to 10 GPH? This is being reviewed. Items observed and hopefully learned from the incident. Always be prepared for the possibility of an emergency landing. Aircraft performance data may not be as depicted by the POH. Monitor the actual data and use those values for flight planning instead of 'arbitrary' published values. Monitor fuel gauges en route, despite their notorious inaccuracy.

Narrative:

Planned VFR flight to ZZZ. Obtained weather forecast and winds aloft from weather network. Based on extrapolated winds forecast for 7500 ft, flight plan called for total flight time of 4 hrs and 10 minutes. Based on POH fuel consumption at that altitide at 2500 RPM would be 4.6 GPH with a total fuel of 4.9 hours. Taking in consideration of takeoff and climb fuel burn, total estimated fuel on board was 4.7 hours. Performed normal preflight inspection of aircraft without any abnormalities noted. En route, ground speed was slightly less than computed using forecast winds. During straight-in approach to Runway 14 at ZZZ, engine began to sputter and quit. This was approx 4.3 hours into flight. I immediately located suitable field for landing and announced to Tower my intentions. During pitch up attitude, engine began to run, but since I had ensured landing at field, I decided to make precautionary landing rather than attempt to make the runway. Uneventful engine out landing was performed. ZZZ Tower contacted via cell phone to announce that I was safe and aircraft was not damaged. 4 gallons of fuel was added and during preflight inspection, left fuel tank sump drain noted to be leaking. After several attempts to get drain to seal, fuel drip was ceased. Aircraft was flown to ZZZ and refueled. Upon returning to final destination and home airport, fuel tank sump drains removed and cleaned by aircraft mechanic. New o-rings installed. I have had problems with fuel drain sump valves in the past and have paid close attention to ensure that they were sealed prior to takeoff, which I'm sure I did on this date. I believe that a more aggressive approach to repairing/replacing them to eliminate possible failure would have prevented incident. In addition, I believe that a more conservative personal minimum fuel reserve requirement for such a long flight rather than the 30 minutes required by regulations would have prevented this incident as well.

Narrative:

Flight was from HDC to ZZZ. While transitioning Austin Class C airspace, the right engine lost power. After checking fuel selector was on main tank and auxiliary fuel pump switched on, engine was eventually shut down and prop feathered. A call to approach was initiated declaring an urgent need to divert to Austin for a precautionary landing. The landing was completed without further incident. Upon examination of engine, it was determined that fuel starvation was the cause of the loss of power. Fuel was added and the engine was run on the ground and checked ok. Fuel requirements for this leg were obtained during preflight planning. However, my calculations of fuel on board prior to departure were miscalculated. My original fuel calculations were being confirmed during the flight by ref to main tank fuel quantity indicators. It is now obvious that the indicators have a significant error in the readings. Upon departure from HDC, I carried 30 gallons in the auxiliary tanks and calculated 25 gallons in the main tanks, for flight endurance of 3.6 hours at a fuel burn of 15.2 GPH. My preflight planning was for three-hour flight to ZZZ. Mains are 60-gallon capacity with 54 gallons usable. The causes of this fuel mismanagement incident are several in this chain of events and are as follows: 1) I had varying amounts of fuel burned out of the main tanks from 3 previous flight legs. This caused my fuel calculations to have a significantly higher deg of error of actual fuel burned when I calculated my fuel on board for the flight leg in question. Needless to say, I did not keep an actual written fuel log and I could only estimate fuel burned prior to departing HDC. 2) I had significantly inaccurate fuel quantity indicators that only reaffirmed my now miscalculated fuel on board. 3) I had a marginal fuel on board versus fuel requirement situation with no added safety margin. In the future, I will pay more attention and conduct a more thorough preflight plan. I will add a greater safety margin to my fuel requirements. I will keep a more accurate and written log of fuel burned for each flight leg. I will not attempt to calculate or estimate fuel burned from several previous flight legs. I will pay more attention to recognize a marginal situation and act in a safe and prudent manner so as to complete the flight safely.

Narrative:

I was returning on a scheduled course flight from Atlanta. Due to fog and low ceilings, I had planned on landing at RDU, but was required to deviate to GSO due to low visibility there as well. After landing at GSO, I had made the decision to fly to Raleigh due to improving conditions. Before my departure, I ordered 30 gallons of fuel. During the fueling, I filed an IFR flight plan, paid for the fuel, then departed Runway 23. While climbing out on a heading of 090 degrees to 5000 feet, I discovered that the cylinder head temperatures were past 500 degrees F-- redline-- and the engines were running a little rough. I then proceeded to check the cowl flaps, which I found to be open. Next, I adjusted the mixture controls but found that the EGT would not rise above midpoint. At this point I was passing 3000 ft, and decided to inform the controller of my situation and the need to return to the airport. From this point, I was vectored for an ILS approach to Runway 23. When I reduced power upon leveling off at 3000 ft, the cylinder head temperatures dropped to 400 degrees. I landed safely after an approach to minimums and taxied to the ramp where I had purchased the fuel. The thought of fuel contamination did come to mind and was confirmed by the line person who had misfueled my airplane. This whole event could have been avoided if the line person fueling the airplane (who had only two months experience) was supervised by myself and/or the more experienced person who was working at the time. Also, the fuel truck could have been equipped with larger nozzles like most other jet fuel trucks. Also, I should have checked the odor of the fuel as a precautionary measure to make sure it was that of 100LL. After the incident, I found out that the line person mistakenly identified my airplane as a Cheyenne, so if I had been more specific in my verbal order of fuel as to the make and model of the aircraft as well as the fuel type, this incident would have never occurred. If all FBOs required their customers to fill out a fuel order form this type of incident could be avoided altogether.