One of AOPA's biggest challenges is assuring that clever bureaucrats and politicians don't ax worthwhile aviation programs in pursuit of false savings. A secret FAA plan to do away with primary air traffic control radar systems is just such a case.
Air traffic control radar sites actually house two types of radars, primary and secondary. The primary radar records what's known as a "skin paint," basically a reflection of radar energy from the aircraft's surface. In addition, the primary radar shows reflections from precipitation, which is presented on the scope along with information from the secondary radar.
Secondary radar is an electronic query of the aircraft's transponder and altitude encoder. With the information from the secondary radar, the controller's computer can easily figure groundspeed and altitude and tag the aircraft for tracking and separation purposes. If the secondary radar fails, the controller reverts to primary radar data — which provides only the skin paint and the weather.
Early this year, AOPA started hearing reports that the FAA was going to publish a notice of proposed remaking (NPRM) mandating transponders with altitude encoders for all aircraft flying above 6,000 feet msl. Upon investigation, documentation was found to support the rumors.
It seems that in August 1993 the FAA signed a decision memorandum to deactivate the primary en route long-range radar system, provided two conditions were met. First, Nexrad information (the new generation of weather radar) must be provided to the controller. The complete Nexrad system is not scheduled to be delivered until the year 2000. Based upon the FAA's past and current history concerning projects of this type, we know the program could be delayed considerably beyond that date. Thus, if the primary radars are decommissioned, the controller will be left without weather information, which is totally unsatisfactory.
The second requirement to be met before the agency would shut down the primary radars is that VFR aircraft flying above 6,000 feet msl and all IFR aircraft be required to have trans-ponders by 1997.
Without primary radar, ATC would not be able to detect any non-transponder-equipped aircraft below 6,000 feet. No primary radar means no service to those aircraft — no advisories, navigation assistance, or monitoring. Above 6,000 feet, a VFR aircraft not talking to ATC and encountering a transponder failure would become invisible to the controllers and to the collision avoidance equipment on airliners. Once the FAA realizes this condition, it could attempt to require dual transponders, generators/alternators, and electrical equipment for all general aviation aircraft.
The U.S. military believes that equipping its fleet with dual transponders will cost taxpayers from $1 billion to $2 billion.
The FAA's decision memorandum was based on a study conducted by Martin Marietta Corporation in 1990, but that five-year-old study is no longer valid. It claimed cost savings for buildings that would be eliminated. However, the buildings would have to remain to house the secondary radar equipment.
Instead of saving money, the move could actually end up costing money. The study claims that $1.4 billion could be saved. The equipment costs for 60 additional secondary sensor locations, which the FAA believes it needs, will be at least $65 million. This does not include the unknown cost for land leases at these locations. Even if the study is accurate, the military, other government agencies, and the users may end up spending $3 billion to $4 billion in equipment to possibly save the FAA $1.4 billion.
And dollars are not the only issue. Now, if the secondary radar fails, the controllers revert to primary radar data. With primary gone the controller will have to employ nonradar procedures, reducing system efficiency. Controller training on nonradar procedures is very minimal.
It is important to note that search and rescue activity uses primary radar data to track downed aircraft, saving many lives.
The decision memorandum was signed by two high-level FAA officials, but it is doubtful that the issue was coordinated within the agency. Air Traffic Requirements, Air Traffic Rules and Procedures, and the safety side of FAA do not have any record of being consulted or concurring on this issue. The National Air Traffic Controllers Association knew nothing of this decision until informed by AOPA. Surely the safety side of the FAA should have participated in this decision.
It is unconscionable that the decision to drop primary radar has been kept secret for almost two years. The first public notice about the elimination of primary radar was given at a presentation by the FAA to the Air Traffic Procedures Advisory Committee on July 12. At the meeting, AOPA touted the need to further think through this important move with regard to safety, system efficiency, and general aviation access.
The most disturbing problem is that the FAA considers it a done deal. There are zero dollars in the FAA's fiscal year 1996 budget to sustain primary radar systems. There is no money programmed in subsequent years either. Why bother to issue an NPRM when the decision has already been made?
It should be made clear that the issue is not one of transponder equippage, but one of aircraft without the needed electrical systems to power such equipment. FAA statistics show 1,050 non-electrical aircraft in the United States. Yet, AOPA research has identified more than 15,000 non-electrical airplanes in the country. When we complete our work, we believe the true number to be 25,000 to 35,000.
With GPS and datalink coming on line, the FAA should investigate these technologies prior to requiring any additional aircraft to be equipped with transponders. Many of these pilots are already flying with battery-operated handheld GPS units that might be equipped to data-link critical information to other aircraft and ground controllers.
AOPA will not allow the secrecy and the lack of user-, controller-, and full-agency input by the FAA on this important issue to go unnoticed. Over the coming months your association will work to bring this ridiculous idea into focus with the regulators, and attempt to integrate all user and agency needs with the technologies and operational practicalities of the future.
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