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CRM

What's in It for Us?

A Nashville couple uses airline techniques in their airplane

To err is human, and therein lies the problem. Flight-crew error remains the leading cause of commercial aircraft accidents, and cockpit resource management is the training technique airlines use to help prevent humans from being, well, quite so human.

The official definition, taken from a US Airways Express CRM pilot-training class attended by AOPA Pilot in Norfolk, Virginia, goes like this: "CRM is the effective use of all resources — hardware, software, leadership, and humanware — to achieve safe and efficient flight operations."

The course contained lots of valuable tips, but are airline practices relevant to general aviation? Nashville surgeon Thomas W. Orcutt and his wife, Betty S. Orcutt (not the couple pictured at left), faced that question 14 years ago and came up with an effective way of sharing cockpit duties that makes flying safer and lowers pilot workload. Their method fits the official CRM (or human factors, as some airlines prefer) definition well.

Both are instrument-rated pilots; Betty is a private pilot with 400 hours, while Tom is a commercial, single- and multiengine pilot with 850 hours.

Initially, duties were strictly divided, as they are on most airlines. The pilot flying simply flew the couple's Beech A36 Bonanza, while the pilot not flying did everything else — radios, navigation, checklists, and backing up the pilot as to proper altitudes and headings. Then one day Tom went to a refresher training course where the emphasis was on single-pilot operations. He discovered that he was overwhelmed because he had become too dependent on a copilot.

So the couple changed its approach to cockpit resource management. The Orcutt philosophy puts the onus on the pilot for communications, checklists, and decision making. The copilot handles navigation, cross-checks the pilot's communication and navigation frequencies for an instrument approach, and assures that altitude requirements are met at the final approach fix and at minimums. The final-approach-fix altitude is especially critical for some of the Orcutts' destinations in mountainous western North Carolina.

"Now I don't feel I am missing a copilot when I fly single-pilot," Tom said. The copilot still has plenty to do, managing the aircraft's loran, RNAV radio, and handheld GPS moving map display that is used as a backup. (Yes, they know it is not approved for IFR operations, and they use it only for additional information.) In addition, the copilot scans for other traffic, keeps a running check on fields in which to land — just in case — and keeps track of the nearest airport.

"We just try to double-check every crucial parameter so that common mistakes aren't made, such as pulling the wrong approach plate," Tom said.

The couple also uses the cockpit management technique when flying VFR, as well, when the pilot not flying concentrates on scanning for traffic. Their method works, as was apparent during an emergency a few years ago.

The couple had a runaway trim problem. Betty, the pilot not flying, knew instantly that she was to support and back up the pilot in such situations, and she offered help immediately. "It took two people to hold on [to the out-of-trim controls] and get the aircraft around the pattern and back down," Tom said.

In addition, the couple shares the decision making during preflight preparation as well. "If one person says the weather doesn't look good, we don't go. The same is true for the approach." Whether the Orcutts knew it or not, that practice follows exactly what US Airways Express pilots are taught — base decision making on the concerns of the less comfortable pilot.

General aviation pilots face a special problem when trying to manage a cockpit. They fly with pilots, nonpilots, and student pilots, but that doesn't mean there are no "humanware" resources to be used. When with a nonpilot, Orcutt spends several minutes before the flight explaining to the passenger how to control the aircraft and how to communicate. Once in the air, he spends a few minutes letting the passenger fly. It is fun for the passenger and gives Orcutt another resource to use in case of a medical emergency.

The pretakeoff briefing he gives nonpilots is important for any flight; it can be abbreviated, however, when another pilot is aboard. It can be as simple as thinking out loud. If you expect the other pilot to help with the flight, say so before takeoff. A pretakeoff briefing of the crew, by the way, is yet another routine airline practice taught in CRM training courses.

The full understanding of pilot duties also reduces the potential for yet another problem addressed in airline CRM courses: conflict. A distracting disagreement while in flight is the nightmare of every conscientious pilot. Here are some examples of actual incidents:

A Cessna T210 takes off and climbs toward cruise altitude as the helpful copilot reaches over to switch to the departure frequency. But the pilot slaps the copilot's hand away from the radio knob. The copilot fumes silently, somewhat intimidated, and resolves never to touch anything again. The pilot thinks that he is running a disciplined, almost military cockpit, but he has closed the door on cooperation. If he climbs through an assigned altitude or turns to the wrong heading, the copilot is not likely to say anything. Slapping the copilot's hand is one method of conducting a crew briefing, but obviously not the best.

Here's another case. Before takeoff two pilots, one experienced and one not, have a discussion about marginal VFR conditions. The experienced pilot wants to wait for the weather to improve. The other does not and suggests that his associate is too timid. The less-experienced pilot wins the argument, and the flight is conducted VFR in conditions that scare them both. CRM training offers these tips: (1) conduct any flight according to the wishes of the less comfortable pilot; and (2) be assertive when you think the flight is headed for trouble.

It can happen to airline pilots, too. In the past year, two airline pilots got into a fistfight over an altitude assignment.

There was also a classic example of poor cockpit communications in Alaska several years ago. The copilot was a last-minute fill-in for a sick crew member and found himself in the role of the least comfortable — and least assertive — pilot on the crew. The issue was whether to land downwind on a foggy, snow-covered, icy runway to save time, or circle to land, as conditions obviously required. Circling meant that the crew might not have time for a meal. The copilot revealed his discomfort with questions, such as, "Sure you like this operation?"

Then the flight engineer cracked a joke about the difference between a duck and a copilot. The punch line was that a duck can fly. The joke silenced the copilot, who said, "Guess you guys know what you're doing." The captain then flew a sloppy, fast approach to stay on schedule and get that meal. The aircraft went off the end of the runway and was severely damaged. Several passengers were injured. The last words from the copilot before impact were, "I told you, John!"

Airline CRM courses offer a five-step process for conflict resolution. The steps do not have to be followed in order. Notice that the copilot in the example above actually followed one or two of the steps. (1) Make an opening statement. (2) Express concern. (3) State the problem. (4) Propose a solution. (5) Achieve agreement.

Let's take an example of a thunderstorm ahead. The pilot not flying notices that the pilot flying is headed straight for it.

Copilot: "Boy, that's a big cell up there. It could be rough. Passengers could get shaken up. What should we do about it? Would you like me to ask the controller for a turn to the left?" Finally, get the agreement of the pilot flying. There is a fine line here between offering assistance and irritating the pilot flying, who may not understand the general idea of cooperation in the cockpit.

When things do not go well and there is a discussion that could lead to hard feelings, then there is a need for a debrief. But not in the airplane. Hold it for afterward, such as in the coffee shop or even the next day. Focus on what was right and what could have been better. Was there an altitude excursion? What led to it?

The whole idea is to keep the cockpit professional and focused, as the Orcutts do. It isn't easy — because we are all, well, human. But it's worth thinking about.

Alton Marsh

Alton K. Marsh

Freelance journalist
Alton K. Marsh is a former senior editor of AOPA Pilot and is now a freelance journalist specializing in aviation topics.

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