With some imagination, equipment failure training can be quite fun. I like to create scenarios in which the student experiences failures in realistic situations. This teaches problem solving as well as familiarizing the student with malfunction symptoms and consequences. Depending on the student's response, it can lead to more training than was originally planned.
Sam is one of my postgraduate instrument students. One fine day last winter we planned a flight to hone his instrument flying skills and practice some equipment failure situations. I told him to plan a trip from Warrenton, Virginia, to Roanoke, Virginia, assuming an overcast ceiling at 800 feet above ground level, with 10 miles' visibility underneath and a freezing level of 6,500 feet mean sea level along the entire route. Unknown to Sam was my plan to give him an imaginary alternator failure and to have his airspeed indicator fail as a result of imaginary pitot icing.
The direct route has an minimum en route altitude of 6,000 feet. Because of the forecast freezing level, Sam planned a longer route east of the mountains at 4,000 feet. His clearance to Roanoke (from me) specified the direct route, with instructions to maintain 6,000 feet. Sam accepted the routing, reasoning that the lower eastern route was nearby if he should en-counter icing. As part of his final check before takeoff, Sam turned on his pitot heater. Shortly thereafter, and without Sam's notice, I pulled the pitot heat circuit breaker.
About 10 minutes after leveling into cruise at 6,000 feet, I reported to Sam that I saw ice accumulating on the wing and strut leading edges. He immediately requested a change in route and descent to 4,000. I, the controller, cleared him as requested, maintain 6,000 for traffic; 4,000 would be available in about 10 miles.
I then covered his airspeed indicator with a Post-it note reading "0 KIAS." Sam correctly diagnosed the cause of the zero airspeed indication as pitot ice and checked that the pitot heater was turned on; it was. He next checked the pitot heat circuit breaker and found it popped. He reset it, but it immediately popped again (with a little help from me). He did not see a big problem with the loss of the airspeed indicator, reasoning that he would shortly be into warmer air and the ice in the pitot tube would melt away along with the ice on the wings and struts. Furthermore, he was confident in his knowledge of the attitudes and power settings required by his Cessna Skylane for approach and landing. He decided that he could safely continue to his destination. I agreed.
Sam was cleared to descend to 4,000 feet. Passing 5,000 feet, I reported that the ice on the wings and struts was disappearing. While Sam was busy with a course change, I pulled the alternator field circuit breaker. It took him about five minutes to notice the discharge indications. He checked the master switch and the alternator circuit breakers. I told him to pretend that the breakers were in and the alternator was dead.
Recognizing the loss of his alternator in instrument meteorological conditions as serious indeed, Sam knew he must land before his battery became fully drained. To extend the time that he had available, he reduced the electrical load as much as possible by turning off all lights. He then reported his situation to the controller (me) and requested clearance to the nearest airport. I cleared him direct to the Orange County nondirectional radio beacon - the initial approach fix for the NDB approach to Gordonsville Airport. For the training value, I am glad Sam did not think further about his choice of airports to which to divert.
Sam's standard is to fly instrument approaches at 90 knots indicated airspeed. He reached the NDB, turned outbound, leveled off, and set his normal power and configuration for 90 kt. During the turn to the inbound course, I removed the Post-it from the airspeed indicator, simulating the disappearance of the ice from the pitot tube. The airspeed read 90 kt. Who needs an airspeed indicator?
The minimum descent altitude for the NDB approach to Gordonsville is 300 feet above our pretended ceiling. Needless to say, Sam did not find the runway at Gordonsville. On the missed approach he requested clearance to an airport with a lower MDA. I cleared him back to the same beacon for the NDB approach to Orange County Airport. Unfortunately for him, during the procedure turn, I reported that the battery died, covered the electric-powered turn coordinator and horizontal situation indicator, and turned off all avionics except the transponder.
It is hard to realize all that is lost when the electricity departs the airplane. In thinking out his situation, Sam wanted to report to ATC, tune in the hometown VOR, and transport himself to his easy chair by the fire, in that order. He found that none could be accomplished without electrons.
In a short time Sam settled on a good, workable plan. Knowing there was low terrain to the east, he turned that direction and started a slow descent. At 800 feet agl, I told him we had broken out under the clouds. He turned toward home and navigated by pilotage into the downwind leg for landing.
The investment of just two hours of flying bought Sam a lot of armor against mishandled equipment failures. He experienced the symptom of a failed pitot heater and the loss of airspeed indication. He proved to himself that the loss of airspeed indication is not serious. If he should experience a complete electrical failure while in IMC for real, he will be less likely to panic - he has been there before, and he survived.
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