Near Duanesburg, at an altitude of 2,500 feet mean sea level (about 1,800 feet above ground level), the instructor initiated the first of two simulated engine failures. The student maneuvered the airplane and performed a touch and go on Runway 28, a 2,600-foot asphalt runway with trees on the approach end. The instructor initiated the second simulated engine failure while on downwind for Runway 28, at 2,000 feet msl. The student made certain that the carburetor heat was on, simulated checking that the throttle was in, and began maneuvering for the runway.
At about 400 feet agl the instructor realized that they would not make the runway and took control of the aircraft. He advanced the throttle, but the engine did not respond. The instructor had only enough time to verify that the throttle and fuel selector were properly set before touchdown. The airplane struck a tree, stalled, and slammed into the ground. The aircraft was substantially damaged, but the instructor and his student suffered only minor injuries. An FAA investigation found no anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have caused a loss of power.
The accident report does, however, hint at the cause of the problem, providing reference to an FAA publication, Tips On Winter Flying. The accident report indicates that, according to the information provided in this publication, the weather conditions at the time were conducive to severe carburetor icing when flying with cruise or climb power. In addition, the publication recommends that "carburetor heat be applied before reducing power and that partial power be used during letdown to prevent icing and overcooling the engine."
As this accident report illustrates, we sometimes operate precariously close to the edge of our safety envelope when we are attempting to create realistic emergency simulations.
When planning a simulated emergency, remember to always leave yourself an out. Continuing a simulation to a point where there is no place to land may unintentionally put you between a rock and a hard place. Low approaches should be continued only when the option to actually land is a viable one. Additional precautions, including completion of the prelanding checklist, use of carburetor heat, and periodic "clearing" of the engine during a simulated engine-out approach, can be critical to a safe outcome.
Consistently using operating principles and safety procedures that preclude the need for emergency procedures is as important as practicing the emergency procedures themselves. Consider the following:
On an evening in early May 1999, the pilot of a Cessna 150 crashed while executing a touch-and-go landing at a private airstrip near Seneca, South Carolina. The pilot and his passenger had departed Pickens County Airport in Pickens, South Carolina, at 5 p.m. en route to Clemson, South Carolina, and stopped at a private grass strip to visit a friend. The friend's car wasn't there, so rather than stopping, the pilot decided to perform a touch and go.
The pilot flew the final approach with 40 degrees of flaps, made an uneventful landing, and selected "flaps up" on the roll. After liftoff, the pilot realized that the flaps had only retracted to the 30-degree position and attempted to retract them during the climbout. As the flaps retracted to 20 degrees, the aircraft lost lift and altitude and struck trees at the departure end of the runway. No preimpact mechanical problems were noted. The pilot and passenger received minor injuries, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage.
According to the pilot's operating handbook, flap deflections of 30 and 40 degrees are not recommended at any time for takeoff. Ten degrees of flaps may be used for short- or soft-field takeoffs.
One way to avoid such accidents is to establish operating procedures that limit the potential for problems. It should be standard operating procedure not to apply power and continue a touch-and-go departure until you have verified that the flaps have retracted to the takeoff position. By not committing to the departure until the aircraft is properly configured, we avoid the potential for human errors and mechanical problems, and we reserve the option to abort the takeoff while in a safe position on the runway.
While instructors like to surprise their students with simulated emergency scenarios, care should be taken to conduct such simulations only if they have been properly planned. Failure to properly establish safety parameters and abide by them on a training flight can undermine the training objectives.
Early one June afternoon in 1999, an instructor and student in a Cessna 172 were en route from Bowers Field in Ellensburg, Washington, to Boeing Field in Seattle, and stopped by Easton State Airport for some simulated emergency practice. Passing near the airport, the instructor reduced engine power and instructed the student to perform a simulated engine-out landing on the airport's 2,640-foot turf runway. The student landed the aircraft successfully on Runway 09, after which the instructor asked the student to perform a soft-field takeoff on Runway 27.
The student told the instructor that she had never performed a simulated or actual soft-field takeoff, so the instructor explained the procedures while the aircraft idled at the end of the runway. Satisfied with the explanation, the student attempted the soft-field takeoff.
On the takeoff roll, the student noticed that the airspeed had climbed only to 40 mph and indicated her concern to the instructor. The instructor said the airspeed would increase after liftoff and coached the student to further increase the pitch to initiate a climb. The aircraft lifted off and accelerated to about 45 mph during the climb, which continued to about treetop level. The speed remained at 45 mph, but the aircraft would no longer climb, so the instructor took the controls and lowered the nose to accelerate. As the aircraft neared the west end of the runway, the instructor was unsure whether or not it would clear the trees just off the end, and he was forced to demonstrate a real emergency procedure - an attempted landing to avoid a collision with the trees.
According to the instructor, the aircraft dropped in from about 20 feet above the runway during the landing flare, resulting in a hard landing that bent back the nose gear. The airplane slid along the ground until it dug into the soft terrain and flipped over. The aircraft was substantially damaged, but the pilot and instructor suffered only minor injuries.
The post-accident investigation determined that the combination of temperature (between 80 and 84 degrees Fahrenheit) and pressure (30.14 mm Hg) yielded a density altitude of nearly 4,000 feet at the time of the accident. According to the aircraft flight manual, a no-wind soft-field takeoff performed at a density altitude of 4,000 feet would have required approximately 2,200 feet to clear a 50-foot obstacle. The required landing distance over a 50-foot obstacle would have been approximately 1,400 feet. The 2,640-foot turf runway left little margin for errors or emergencies on that hot day in June.
This accident highlights the importance of preflight planning and preparation. We all know that the cockpit is a relatively poor classroom, and maneuvers are better taught in a classroom setting before conducting the flight training. A review of aircraft takeoff and landing performance, combined with the forecast weather conditions, might have revealed how little margin for error would be available for operations on a relatively short grass runway. By doing our homework with respect to preflight planning and preparation, we can often avoid the need for emergency procedures.
While emergency procedures training is a critical element in initial and recurrent flight training, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. We must always remember that practicing emergency procedures requires striking a delicate balance between emergency prevention and practice of simulated emergency skills. In addition to practicing emergency procedures, we must learn to follow the procedures that limit the potential for needing them.
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