I just finished reading Julie K. Boatman's " Ounce of Prevention: Stay Focused" (June Pilot) and it was a perfect capstone to my very recent training as a Part 135 pilot. I recently retired from the Navy (as a submariner) and wanted to do some flying part time, and Part 135 fit the bill. We fly Piper Lances and Aztecs. My instructor spent quite a bit of time with me talking about pretakeoff briefs on what we would do if we lost an engine in the Aztec.
Although conceptually it was always on my mind, to go through a briefing prior to every takeoff was awkward at first, but eventually it became more natural. However, I don't think I ever really thought through the causality to the end point, especially flying the single-engine Lance. (In fact, the engine-out there was conceptually in my mind, but certainly not in my forethought for takeoffs.)
Boatman's article made a couple more neurons connect in my brain, and when I thought the whole situation through — something that came from my submarine background of anticipating every possibility — I realized I needed to evaluate for every flight (even in my Cessna 170) what I will do (i.e., exercise the emergency checklist), while at the same time flying the airplane to a landing I can walk away from (not necessarily on the runway).
Since the Part 135 operation flies out of Missouri's Kansas City Downtown Airport, I think I need to evaluate where I would make an emergency landing for every runway — including left-turnout, right-turnout, and straight-ahead departures.
Thanks for the timely article that I am sure will improve the safety margin for this pilot.
Bill Venohr AOPA 1129182
Lawrence, Kansas
"Ounce of Prevention: Stay Focused" did a very good job of covering safety issues during takeoff. One area I would like to add is the "deadly turn back to the airport." All too often we see accident reports where a pilot tried to make it back to the airport when an engine failed on takeoff. This is an area that I think deserves more attention, and it is something that few instructors really drive home.
One day after reading an accident report I thought to myself, "How much altitude is enough?" The next time I was out in my Piper Archer, I put it to the test. I climbed to a safe altitude to simulate a failure on takeoff. I picked a straight highway to use as my simulated runway, slowed the airplane down, and then began to climb at V Y. At my target altitude, I pulled the power to idle to simulate a failure. In my test, I then counted to five, since in the real world none of us would react instantly. I'm sure that if I had a real failure, there would be a few seconds of "oh, no." I followed normal procedures for my airplane and began trying to turn back toward my "runway."
I trimmed for best glide and used a standard-rate turn. During this test, and subsequent tests in different wind conditions, I consistently lost between 700 and 800 feet getting turned around to make even a downwind landing. I realized that at airports with multiple runways, less altitude may be required. But the lesson I learned from these exercises is: When I am departing an airport, I add that altitude to the field elevation. If I have a problem before I reach that target altitude, I'm not going to even consider turning around. This is now part of my pretakeoff checklist.
Robert Hanlon AOPA 1218541
Aston, Pennsylvania
Thank you for your treatment of the June 1, 1999, accident of American Airlines Flight 1420 (" Safety Pilot Landmark Accidents: Bowling Alley Blues," June Pilot).
You should know that the image of the flight path of 1420 superimposed ýpon the WSR-88D Doppler radar image displayed on page 103, and included in the NTSB public docket, was objected to by both American and the Allied Pilots Association as an inaccurate depiction. The WSR-88D image published was recorded after the time of the accident, and did not depict the weather at the time of approach and landing. This image has been replaced by a series of images better depicting the weather that existed during those flight phases.
Capt. C.D. Zwingle
Fort Worth, Texas
Zwingle was the Allied Pilots Association's NTSB party coordinator in the Flight 1420 investigation — Ed.
"Bowling Alley Blues" depicted a weather radar picture that was not available in the cockpit. Successful decisions are made when all information affecting a flight is available to the crew. Also not available to the crew was the runway .ontamination report. During inclement weather the Canadians deploy an observer to the runway with a radio so approaching crews can be provided with up-to-the-minute runway contamination reports.
Unfortunately, NTSB accident narratives lack adequate representation of the struggle a crew encounters in the seconds or minutes prior to an accident. Contributing to this is the lack of a recording device or a stenographer when the NTSB interviews surviving pilots. This causes an inability to study what a surviving pilot says to the NTSB in the post-accident interview and thus limits what is learned from the accident.
At Little Rock, had the FAA not issued a waiver to the airport for not having breakaway approach light supports, my friend would have flown again. Godspeed, Captain!
Charles N. Valle AOPA 1496049
Woodstock, Illinois
I was especially interested in Julie K. Boatman's " Flying Your Desk" (June Pilot) on personal computer-based aviation training devices (PCATDs). I have been a CFII for more than 34 years and did contract work for Professional Instrument Courses doing 10-day instrument ratings using the old ATC-610 desktop simulator. Eventually I saw the value of using a PCATD in my own training program and can only report that I have found them to be invaluable.
I used the OnTop PCATD hardware/software because it works on most any PC. It offers more aircraft options and comes with both single- and multiengine controls. I love how I can show holding patterns and have the student replay each "flight." For positional awareness and teaching, this is the greatest thing that has come along in years. I have definitely cut down the time it takes me to do a 10-day concentrated instrument rating with a client.
Tom Gilmore AOPA 463789
St. Clair Shores, Michigan
I wanted to comment on " Pilot Counsel: Supplemental Oxygen" (June Pilot). I did a personal experiment recently, using a recording pulse oximeter during a solo flight. I began recording at takeoff and climbed to 9,500 feet msl in my Piper Tri-Pacer. I am 10 years older than the airplane, and we both made it.
Several observations I made from review of the recorded data included a significant increase in my pulse rate at the time of takeoff, a significant decrease in my tissue oxygen level beginning at about 5,500 feet, and associated slowing of my thought processes at 9,500 feet. The O2 saturation dropped 10 to 12 percent and remained stable from 6,000 to 9,500 feet, returning to baseline after descending below 5,000 feet again.
I presented this information to my local flying club, and a number of technical questions arose about temperature, pressure (Boyle's Law), and the function of the airplane vs. the human response. As a physician, I offered that the human is able to adapt somewhat by increased heart rate and respiratory rate. I also learned that my capacity, although I am in general good health, is more limited than I thought at age 54.
The pressurized airplane is limited to a cabin altitude of about 9,000 feet, as I understand it. The lesson is that it may be a good idea to find out what our response to altitude change is, both in terms of cardiovascular risk and mental alertness, and to have supplemental oxygen available for those times when we make flights above our personal limitations for extended periods of time — even though the regulations don't specify that we "have to."
James Steinman AOPA 892376
Ilion, New York
I disagree with the advice given the CFI seeking to renew his credentials after an 11- or 12-year layoff in " Answers for Pilots: Back to School" (June Pilot). Come on — despite some major amendments to the regulations, not that much has changed about flying in the past dozen years. He has already begun taking flight instruction, and your advice to bone up on the new Part 61 and 91 is exactly what he is seeking, but in a more formal manner. As a CFI and a college professor, I would think that a structured course taught by a qualified instructor would be far superior to scrounging around on one's own trying to find out what's new in the regs.
Surely this could be accomplished in the several weeks that he is willing to invest. Even if such a program does not currently exist, I would think that one of the major flight schools could come up with one custom-designed for this purpose. Also, I can't believe that either the instructor or the flight school employing him would encourage taking on a brand-new student right after renewing his ticket.
H.C. "Skip" Smith AOPA 091804
State College, Pennsylvania
The Cessna 185 shot down by a Peruvian military jet was not a U.S.-registered aircraft, as stated in " Pilot Counsel: In-Flight Interception" (July Pilot).
The Garmin GNS 530 and 430 are not Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)-compatible, as stated in " AOPA Bonanza Sweepstakes: A Glass-Cockpit Bonanza" (July Pilot). However, the units can be upgraded to receive the WAAS signal, according to a Garmin spokesman. The FAA has not yet certified WAAS for use under instrument flight rules. Pilot regrets the error.
We welcome your comments. Address your letters to: Editor, AOPA Pilot , 421 Aviation Way, Frederick, Maryland 21701. Send e-mail to [email protected] . Include your full name, address, and AOPA member number on all correspondence, including e-mail. Letters will be edited for style and length.