Letters

Stabilized approaches

I agree with Michael Maya Charles regarding the benefits of " The Stabilized Approach" (November 2000 Pilot). However, there is a significant error in one of his assumptions. He repeatedly suggests that a contributing factor to the recent Southwest Boeing 737 overrun accident in Burbank, California, was the pilots' acceptance of an air traffic control instruction to "maintain at or above 3,000 until the Burbank [should be Van Nuys] VOR." All aircraft on approaches to Burbank's Runway 8 have to meet this requirement, since they cross Van Nuys Airport, whose pattern is 2,000 feet on the west and 1,800 feet on the east. Since the touchdown zone elevation is 727 feet, the 737 pilots had six miles to descend 2,273 feet, or 379 feet per mile. Rather than implicating ATC for what is a mandatory instruction familiar to all pilots operating at Burbank, Charles should have put this one squarely on the failure to stabilize the approach prior to the final descent.

Don Mirisch AOPA 1306704
Tarzana, California

I have to take issue with Michael Maya Charles and anyone else who admonishes all pilots to always use a stabilized approach. I agree that weather, equipment, runway conditions, and piloting skill may dictate that this is the best approach. But for ordinary lightplane VFR flying it is not. Let's say you are flying the stabilized approach on the visual approach slope indicator (VASI) or the glideslope at 1,000 feet agl, fully dirty, prop forward, and at published approach speed. If your engine quits, get ready to eat dirt.

I say that if conditions permit (and they usually do, especially if you practice this skill), fly your approach high and hot. Take it from a pilot who has benefited from high and hot to limp a silent airplane to a very welcome runway.

Jim Parrish AOPA 936782
Terrell, Texas

We have it good

I read Phil Boyer's " President's Position: We Have It Good" (November 2000 Pilot) with interest. My wife and I visited Scotland last May, and as we traveled around the beautiful countryside, I kept saying to her that I wondered where all the GA aircraft could be. "How is it that we haven't seen any single-engine aircraft flying around this beautiful landscape?" The answer to my question became quite clear when I purchased an AOPA-United Kingdom publication on learning to fly. I discovered that the average rental cost for a Cessna 150 was $125 to $150 per hour, and that a Piper Warrior was at least $30 an hour more! There were ads throughout the magazine for package deals to take lessons in the United States—including the hotel and airfare to the United States, it was still cheaper than learning to fly in the United Kingdom. I know that part of the problem is their high cost of fuel, but the bigger problem seems to be the user fees.

Donald W. Jacobson AOPA 1206861
North Branford, Connecticut

Instrument failure

" Safety Pilot: Pilot Disorientation" (November 2000 Pilot) was a somber reminder that even the best of us can have a short day because of an apparent equipment failure in instrument meteorological conditions. Although Bruce Landsberg points out that no certain cause for the tragedy has been determined, and that certain facts are unknown, the accident does revolve around the weak link in general aviation IFR operations, namely the vacuum and attitude instrument systems.

The aircraft in the article was equipped with a standby vacuum pump with an electrical clutch arrangement that presumably would activate the standby pump if needed. I fly a twin-engine aircraft with a vacuum pump on each engine running continuously. It is beyond my comprehension as to why an engine-driven vacuum pump would have a clutch. Just run the standby full time, like a twin. Running the standby pump full time accomplishes several objectives. The standby pump can be checked for proper operation as part of the preflight checklist. If the standby pump fails you will know it and can service it before the next flight.

The other issue that may have been involved in this tragedy is the fact that most light aircraft are equipped with only two indicators of bank attitude—the turn and bank, and the artificial horizon. Pitch attitude can be extrapolated from airspeed, vertical speed, engine rpm, and even the sound of the engine and slipstream. Not so the bank attitude. If one of your two bank-indicating instruments fails in IMC, then you are in trouble.

What's the answer? About $400 for a second vacuum-powered artificial horizon. With the second artificial horizon and a healthy vacuum gauge reading, the two horizons would have provided the answer.

Peter A. McLean AOPA 914753
Fort Mill, South Carolina

I was well acquainted with the subject of "Safety Pilot: Pilot Disorientation." The unnamed pilot was a member of my Coast Guard Auxiliary division and I had flown with him on a number of occasions. I would like to set the record straight on one error in Landsberg's article. The pilot was not a medical doctor. He held a Ph.D., albeit in the health sciences. As a result, he had no more access to prescription drugs than any other person. I feel that this misstatement tends to disparage the memory of this pilot.

Andrew G. Nelson AOPA 024752
Harpers Ferry, West Virginia

What was the lesson?

It was a great idea, the 3,000-mile instrument training flight from Minnesota to Florida and back (" From Sea to Shining Sea," November 2000 Pilot). But the instructor took his student in a Skyhawk into icing conditions five times, according to his own admission. Just what was the lesson?

Bill Reinecke AOPA 1408994
Reston, Virginia

Launching memories

I was enjoying " Skyway Patrol" (November 2000 Pilot) when I turned the page and saw the great shot of the shuttle launch with the caption "…best seat in the house and it is still several miles away." It took me back 31 years.

In the summer of 1969, I was flying RF-4Cs at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. I was upgrading to instructor pilot (IP), which meant I flew from the rear seat. On the morning of the launch of Apollo 11, like everybody else in the world, all of us in the thirty-third squadron were riveted to the TV and following the countdown. As luck would have it, Bob Caudry (my IP) and I were scheduled to fly at exactly the same time as the countdown was scheduled to reach zero. I was disappointed. As we stepped to the jet about 45 minutes before takeoff, I figured we'd missed the big event. While taxiing out, however, I suddenly remembered we had both an inertial navigation system and high-frequency radio on board, and the controls were in the backseat with me. As an upgrading IP, I had to learn to operate these machines!

And so it was I who looked up the coordinates for Patrick Air Force Base and the frequency for the Voice of America and plugged them in. As we took the active for takeoff, Apollo 11 was about five minutes from launch, some 344 miles away on a bearing of 187 degrees. In those days we could fly VFR up to Flight Level 240, so Caudry aimed the Phantom south and we began to climb at 350 knots.

I remember the weather as being clear with some haze below as we climbed higher.

We listened to the countdown through the HF and it finally reached zero as we reached about 20,000 feet. Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and Michael Collins were on their way.

Climbing through the skies of South Carolina, we didn't have the faintest idea when or if we'd ever see any trace of Apollo 11. It must have been 30 to 45 seconds later when I heard Bob shout, "Wow! Look at that," as he broke left so I could see off the right. Starting from the haze below and continuing straight up into an arc that disappeared in the blue was the granddaddy of all vertical contrails. What impressed Bob the most was its instantaneous appearance, reflecting an immense speed as Apollo 11 accelerated toward orbit.

I spend my flying days now in a 172. After reading your article, I'll enjoy future space shots from here in Pennsylvania.

Dick Troy AOPA 1082942
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania

Errata

Prohibited area P-40, which surrounds the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, was misidentified in " To New, Blue Skies" (December 2000 Pilot). In addition, Tim Snider was not credited for his photograph of Montana's Benchmark Airport, which accompanied the story (p. 86).

William J. Schulte is misidentified in a photo caption accompanying " ASF at Fifty" (November 2000 Pilot, p. 64). He is shown talking with Leslie Bryan. At the time, Schulte was head of the FAA's office of general aviation affairs.

A review of Monroy Aerospace's ATD-200 Air Traffic Detector (" Pilot Products," November 2000 Pilot) contained an incorrect statement about traffic alert and collision avoidance systems (TCASs) installed in airliners and some other large aircraft. TCAS is an active system that interrogates transponders of nearby aircraft, and therefore is effective at detecting transponder-equipped aircraft in areas without radar service. The ATD-200 and some other GA-oriented alternatives are passive, depending on air traffic control radar—or other sources—to stimulate transponder replies. For example, an ATD-200 or other passive device can detect a transponder reply initiated by a TCAS interrogation. However, none of these systems can identify aircraft without working transponders.

Because of incorrect information received, the price for the talking timer audio input adapter (" Pilot Products," November 2000 Pilot) was incorrect. The retail price is $98.

We welcome your comments. Address your letters to: Editor, AOPA Pilot , 421 Aviation Way, Frederick, Maryland 21701. Send e-mail to [email protected] . Include your full name, address, and AOPA member number on all correspondence, including e-mail. Letters will be edited for style and length.