Not long ago, a friend was operating a charter flight and dropped off his passengers at Denver. While preparing for his return home, he noticed that a fast-moving line of bellowing thunderstorms might affect his arrival and create additional flight-planning problems.
After determining what he considered to be a reasonable course of action, he pulled a little black book from his jacket pocket, selected the number, and placed a call to someone with whom he often consulted when adverse weather threatened a flight.
The voice at the other end of the line listened patiently to my friend's plan and eventually volunteered a suggestion. My friend agreed with the advice and amended his flight plan accordingly.
He then walked to the airplane, climbed into the cockpit, and called for his first officer to read the before-starting-engines checklist of the TWA Boeing 767.
Last September I had the great privilege of being invited to fly a Lockheed U–2 on a high flight over California and Nevada ("High Flight," January Pilot). Prior to departure, Air Force Maj. Dean Neeley asked me to participate in the planning of our two-hour flight. Joining us in Operations was Lt. Col. Greg Barber, another U–2 pilot, to whom Neeley recited the details of our planned flight. This included fuel burn and load, applicable notams, weather, status of en route facilities, alternate airports, and a plethora of other details. When every facet of the flight had been reviewed, Neeley looked up at Barber as if to ask, What do you think? "Looks OK to me," Barber replied. "Have a good one."
These are two examples of professional pilots who obviously were qualified to plan and execute their flights, yet each was required to consult with someone else.
In the first example, FAR Part 121 requires that airline captains consult with a dispatcher and obtain his agreement regarding the planning details of every flight. No agreement? No flight. The Air Force has similar safeguards.
Such a procedure serves two purposes. One is to ensure that some important factor has not been overlooked or inadequately considered. The second prevents personal motivation — also known as destinationitis — from tainting the decision-making process. After all, the dispatcher has no personal involvement in the outcome of a flight other than to ensure that it is a safe one.
Doesn't it seem somewhat incongruous that highly experienced pilots are required to gain approval of their flight plans prior to departure but relatively low-time pilots operating under FAR Part 91 are not? Isn't it strange that a 40-hour private pilot can depart on a flight and subject his passengers to conditions that might ground a Boeing 767 crew?
Whoa! Before anyone gets upset with where they think I am heading, allow me to say up front that I categorically am not suggesting that the FAA recruit and develop a corps of dispatchers to approve and monitor general aviation flight plans. I simply want to highlight one of many points proving that those operating under Part 91 have far more freedom than those for whom flying is a livelihood. Unfortunately, this freedom also provides a greater opportunity to unwittingly terminate our flights and lives prematurely. Freedom can be a curse in disguise unless exercised responsibly.
For argument's sake, assume that general aviation pilots not flying for hire also have to consult with a "dispatcher" and obtain planning concurrence prior to all cross-country flights. If that were the case, might not Jessica Dubroff, John F. Kennedy Jr., and many others still be alive?
I have a close friend who owns a Beech F33A Bonanza. He has been flying for 44 years, but when gnawing doubts develop while planning a flight, he calls to discuss his concerns. As a result of our mentoring sessions, he usually departs feeling more confident. On occasion, he cancels a flight and feels pretty good about that, too.
A student pilot embarks on cross-country flights only after his instructor has had a chance to review the student's preparation. Then one day the student becomes certificated and suddenly assumes sole responsibility for his flights. He presumably is qualified to exercise good planning judgment, but he may not be prepared to assess the personal and peer pressures that can compel a pilot to depart when perhaps he should not.
My suggestion is that low-time pilots have a trusted and experienced friend available to discuss an upcoming flight whenever doubt, anxiety, or pressure creeps into the flight-planning equation.
High-time pilots also have been known to violate the rules of common sense. They might consider asking themselves, "If I had to consult with a dispatcher regarding my flight, would he condone or condemn my plan?" The mere act of asking this question can help to create the mindset needed to recognize when a flight should be modified, postponed, or canceled.
As another good friend used to say, "No pilot should ever be willing to take chances to complete a flight at a given time or on a given day. No flight is that important. In two years or five, it won't matter one way or the other. His life will be unaffected by not having operated that flight. His life will be affected, however, if he fails to survive it."
Visit the author's Web site ( www.barryschiff.com).
Related Articles
