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Accident Analysis

Not The Wright Stuff

History That Shouldn't Be Repeated
The Wright brothers took the mystery out of powered flight on December 17, 1903. So why do so many latter-day pilots insist on putting it back in?

Aviation has changed the world time and time again since the days of flights that lasted mere seconds and ended up nose-down in the sand. But flights that fit that description still occur. And nowhere in any flight-training course is there a requirement for an aviation trainee to walk a mile in the shoes of Orville or Wilbur Wright, to become acquainted with their drive, intellectual discipline, and patience as aeronautical pioneers and design engineers - and perhaps acquire a measure of reverence for their achievements.

One need not know the area of their aircraft's wing (510 square feet), the capacity of its fuel tank (a gallon), or the extent to which they had to engage in what Harry Combs, in his book Kill Devil Hill, described as "mind-numbing calculations" to address such problems as developing an efficient propeller. There are no questions about this on the knowledge or practical tests. So perhaps it isn't that surprising that pilots continue to mark the anniversary of the first powered flight by putting their haphazardly inventive stamp on aviation, thereby accounting year after year for the majority of aerial mishaps.

On December 17, 1997, the ninety-fourth anniversary of powered flight, a Beechcraft C35 Bonanza descended into a road embankment after losing power during climbout after a touch-and-go landing at the Skylane Airport in Evansville, Indiana. The 725-hour pilot (who had 225 hours in the accident aircraft make and model) received fatal injuries. Investigators reviewed all the relevant evidence in their usual meticulous fashion. Weather: good VFR. Light wind at a nearby tower-controlled airport, and not a factor. Control continuity: established. Scratches found on one propeller blade but not the other, which suggests that the blade wasn't rotating at impact.

The National Transportation Safety Board also noted that "the green fuel line from the airframe firewall to the engine-driven fuel pump was disconnected at the engine-driven fuel pump end. No fuel was in the line." The reference to the "green" hose was developed further in the report, after inquiries with its manufacturer. "A representative of the company reported that the company had not made aviation hoses for many years." The company rep identified the product "as a rubber, steel-belted hose used for petroleum-based products. He reported that typical uses would be for transmission or antifreeze hoses." The NTSB report also observed, "[A] witness reported that the pilot did much of the maintenance on his own aircraft, although the pilot was not an Airframe and Powerplant (A) mechanic. The witness reported an authorized mechanic would check the maintenance the pilot had performed." The cause of the accident, said the NTSB, was "improper maintenance by the use of a loose-fitting, unapproved fuel line, which resulted in fuel starvation and the loss of engine power."

Seven hundred pounds - that's what the Wright brothers' first engine would be asked to propel aloft on the first flight, and there was considerable doubt as to whether it could do the job. A modern-day Cessna 150 weighs a bit more than double that amount when loaded at gross weight. Its performance at gross weight is considerably different from its behavior, say, minus one of two 175-pound occupants - hence the traditional reminder to first-solo student pilots that the airplane will seem noticeably livelier without the CFI on board. The reverse is therefore true: When a second occupant is invited aboard to participate in what is usually a one-pilot operation, performance will suffer. The same day as the Bonanza crash in Indiana, a Cessna 150 crashed in Jacksonville, Florida, while attempting to pick up a banner for towing. Two pilots were aboard, along with 18 gallons of fuel, and the NTSB-calculated gross weight for the flight was estimated at an overload of 47 pounds. "Seconds into the climb, the airplane was observed in a steep nose-up attitude. Subsequently, the airplane collided with the ground several hundred feet northeast of the banner pick-up point in a nose-down attitude. [An] eyewitness also stated that the engine continued to run throughout the maneuver. The airframe damage was typical of a stall impact," said the official report.

The FAA's certificate of waiver for the banner-towing operation, issued four months prior to the accident, states that "only crew members essential to the operation should be carried on the banner-tow flight." The typical banner-tow flight requires only one pilot. According to the operator, the second pilot was not approved for this flight." Cause of this eminently avoidable accident, as determined by the NTSB: "The pilot's failure to maintain adequate flying speed following a banner pickup, which resulted in a stall and an uncontrolled collision with the ground." A related factor was exceeding the maximum gross weight of the airplane.

Flight into deteriorating weather has emerged over the years since the first powered flight as a cause of a large percentage of aircraft accidents. After flight itself was conquered, devising a method of controlling an aircraft solely by reference to flight instruments became one of the next challenges, and it was approached with appropriate deference for the difficulties it posed. For those unable or unequipped to do so, the dilemma has always been clear: Catch the problem early enough and it becomes a nonevent; catch it too late and the results are frequently fatal. Second chances don't always come along if turning back or diverting isn't done. So it is noteworthy when an inferior Plan B works out favorably.

On December 17, 1995, an off-airport landing occurred in Bryceville, Florida, when a student pilot flying from Brunswick, Georgia, to Waycross, Georgia, on a solo cross-country flight encountered deteriorating weather. "He became disoriented while trying to maintain VFR. The pilot attempted a precautionary landing in a field. During the landing roll the airplane hit a barbed wire fence and nosed over," said the NTSB. The student pilot had also reduced his margin of safety by not having filed and opened a VFR flight plan. Perhaps the NTSB took that into account when tersely attributing the accident cause to "[t]he pilot's improper planning/ decision." Yet credit must be given for the precautionary landing when disorientation precluded other options except the worst one of all - continuing on.

The same cause, but with a more detailed account of its components, was cited by the NTSB after a December 17, 1984, attempted takeoff from Point Hope, Arkansas. Facing strong crosswinds and blowing snow, the pilot of a Cessna U206 with five charter passengers aboard nonetheless attempted his departure. "Investigation revealed that the takeoff was attempted with surface winds reported as quartering directly across the takeoff runway from 30 to more than 40 kt, with visibility as low as 100 feet restricted by blowing snow. The pilot indicated he encountered a whiteout condition at liftoff." There were no serious injuries.

In addition to the familiar accident cause of "flight into known adverse weather conditions by the pilot in command," the NTSB included another cause: "Overconfidence in personal ability." But here's a thought: Is that so-called overconfidence really the manifestation of insecurity in one's ability to refuse a flight that seems unwise? That's a question all pilots should ponder as a matter of keeping faith with themselves and the passengers whose trust they enjoy. And perhaps if we always imagined our actions to be subject to the scrutiny of a review board consisting of history's first two fliers, pilots might keep their less-prudent impulses in check before attempting to replicate the achievement that occurred on a North Carolina beach 99 years ago.

Dan Namowitz is an aviation writer and flight instructor. A pilot for 18 years and an instructor for 12, he enjoys learning to fly "anything new and different."

Dan Namowitz
Dan Namowitz
Dan Namowitz has been writing for AOPA in a variety of capacities since 1991. He has been a flight instructor since 1990 and is a 35-year AOPA member.

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