Buzzing occurs when you make a high-airspeed, high-rpm dive that terminates at low altitude. The high velocity of the propeller's blade tips generates a noise that causes everyone on the ground to look up.
If we are flying in the early morning or late afternoon, I orient the maneuver so that I am diving toward the rising or setting sun, which makes it impossible for the student to see the large radio tower that lies ahead of us. When just below the top of the tower, I say "Watch out!" and abruptly climb away from the hazard. Students never see the tower until I make the callout.
Scud running occurs when you attempt to fly below low, terrain-obscuring clouds in order to maintain visual conditions. You are trying desperately to get to your destination, and it looks like you can make it.
If we are flying when it's hazy and the lighting is correct, I tell the student to assume that low clouds are present, and we are going to fly at low altitude through a pass in order to get home. The student does not know that a group of hard-to-see radio towers is located on the far side of the pass. When we get close to the towers, I say "Watch out!" and abruptly climb away from the hazard. Students seldom see the towers until I make the callout.
In each case, I tell students that buzzing and scud running are two of the dumbest things a pilot can do. Those actions cause accidents.
Everyone then says, "OK, but I would never do that."
And I say, "That's the big lie. The pilots who had the accidents made the same statement when they were student pilots."
Flight safety experts have beaten human factors and accident prevention to death. You are exposed to their findings in every flight training course, aviation seminar, and aviation publication. Even so, accidents continue.
Flight Facts, a U.S. Army aviation publication, made this statement: "When first attained, each new plateau of risk seems to be the last." Compare how you felt during your first night flight to how you felt after making several such flights. The same comparison can be made to flying over mountainous terrain. For every repeated endeavor, the risk factor will decrease in your mind, but in reality it never changes. The assumption that risk has diminished is called pilot complacency, and this is a major factor in many aviation accidents.
A retired FAA air safety program manager said, "Flight safety consists of attitude, knowledge, and proficiency." That's the best summary I've ever heard, and pilot complacency would most certainly fall under the attitude category.
I've observed other attitudes that cause problems. When I see a pilot who acts as an aviation know-it-all or acts as though he or she is God's gift to aviation, I see an accident waiting to happen. Most of the outstanding pilots that I've flown with over the years don't flaunt their talents or knowledge. They know how easy it is to make a mistake or fall under the spell of the big lie. Aviation is no place for big egos.
During December 2002 and January 2003, three fatal accidents occurred in my area. Two were the result of scud running, and the third was structural failure while the aircraft was vectored for an instrument approach. Thunderstorms had been forecast and were, in fact, in the area - yes, they can occur during the winter months. These three accidents involved the big lie, complacency, and failure to use available resources.
You must know how to interpret weather reports and charts - now available on the Internet; how to obtain a proper weather briefing; and how to utilize the flight service station system, the en route flight advisory service (Flight Watch), and hazardous in-flight weather advisory service (HIWAS). Above all, you must never become a victim of the big lie.
Ralph Butcher, a retired United Airlines captain, is the chief flight instructor at a California flight school. He has been flying for 43 years and has 25,000 flight hours in fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Visit his Web site.