Letters

How low do they go?

In January's AOPA Pilot article " How Low Do They Go?" the author several times refers to descending to 500 or 1,000 feet agl while in the military operations area (MOA). The sectional chart piece that illustrates the article has a notation in several places stating, "MOA excludes airspace at and below 1,500 feet agl." I frequently fly under MOAs that have the same sort of limitation shown on the sectional. Am I wrong in thinking that I'm avoiding dogfighters by going under an MOA? If not, what does that notation really mean?

Brian J. Von Bevern AOPA 620876
Olathe, Kansas

I'm sure you'll hear from many on this subject. According to the article "How Low Do They Go?" author Tim Wright's flight was conducted at 1,000 feet agl, but typically these flights are done at 500 agl. The photo of the sectional chart clearly shows the words "MOA excludes airspace at and below 1,500 feet agl." So after all the diatribe that general aviation should avoid flying in active MOAs, we come to find out they were not actually in, but were below, the MOA themselves!

Norman Smith AOPA 828173
San Jose, California

If you check the special-use airspace chart in the margins of the Washington Sectional, you'll see that the Farmville MOA ranges from 300 feet to 5,000 feet. The 1,500-agl exclusions that you see in the body of the chart refer to cutout areas for several airports, including Chase City Municipal and Crewe Municipal. The arrows pointing to these areas get lost in the detail-rich chart. To underscore that point, Wright received a call from a retired Harrier pilot and Pax River Test Pilot School alumnus. They talked briefly about similar notes and the caller's comment was, "You know, I've always found that confusing." — The Editors

Amicable Aeronca Chief

I recognized the airplane on the cover before I read the article or even glanced at the graphics just above the right wing (" Budget Buys: Amicable Aeronca Chief," January Pilot). I wondered if Rick Durden would mention the only thing I didn't like about this airplane (the starter) and sure enough, he did. "A long, vertical lever by the pilot's left knee was connected, via cable, to a ratchet device on the crankshaft...." He went on to say, "Sadly, the system proved unreliable to use, and most owners cast them aside...." I can attest to that. In 1948, I was working as a ramp rat for tips and very little salary at the local airport. My supervisor, Bill Bedinger, became the proud owner of a new Aeronca Chief. It was a slow day and he offered me a ride. We took off, flew around the airport for a while, and then he said the words that all passengers hate to hear: "Watch this." With that, he shut the engine down and waited for the prop to quit windmilling. He reached up under the instrument panel, grabbed the lever, and gave it a sharp tug. The cable broke and the prop stayed put. Bill was not the excitable type, and we made a dead-stick landing on the runway. I flew right seat in the airplane on several occasions after that, but Bill never repaired the cable.

Billy F. Worden AOPA 908181
Fort Worth, Texas

Test Pilot

In the " Test Pilot" section of the January AOPA Pilot, the answer to question 10 says that rate of climb varies inversely with weight, which is surely true. I don't think, however, that the relationship is linear, as implied in the statement that doubling the weight would cut the climb rate in half. My Cessna 182 will climb at about 1,000 feet per minute at 3,000 pounds. I don't think it will do 500 fpm at 6,000 pounds. I'm not going to try it, and I hope nobody else does.

Frank Thompson AOPA 1362446
Columbia, Tennessee

I'm sure you will have a flood of people telling you that the answer to question 10 in your "Test Pilot" quiz in the January issue is wrong, but I'm going to tell you that too. Your answer was that decreasing aircraft weight by 50 percent increased climb rate 100 percent. The climb rate would depend on how much excess power you had for climb and is not necessarily proportional to the weight of the aircraft. For example: You are flying at your absolute ceiling, with a climb rate of zero. Decreasing your aircraft weight only slightly will increase your climb rate infinitely; increasing your aircraft weight only slightly will decrease your climb rate infinitely (i.e., negative rate of climb).

Charles Bendixen, CFII AOPA 356231
Flagstaff, Arizona

Barry Schiff writes: That is what I get for trying to simplify something that is a bit more complex. I was using the correct relationship: Climb rate equals 33,000 times the difference between power available (PA) and power required (PR) divided by weight. This, of course, establishes the linear and direct relationship between weight and climb rate as long as the ratio of PA to PR remains constant, which it does not. In my defense, however, the purpose of the question was to show that small changes in weight that occur within the normal operating envelope do result in enough of a linear relationship for a pilot to use this relationship to predict the effect they have on climb rate. Therefore, I should have asked the question by including the preface, "Everything else being equal...." But then, of course, I am asking the reader to make an impossible assumption, particularly when extraordinary increases in gross weight are considered.

Wrecked wreck

After 33 years as a flying club and rental pilot, I can attest that the official investigation may have missed another plausible reason for the crash of the Piper Malibu Mirage (" Safety Pilot: Wrecked Wreck," January Pilot). Because of all the postmortem work done on the wreck, there was no doubt that the Malibu Mirage was being operated despite much-needed repairs. Yet the official cause of the crash was that the 12,000-hour pilot, who owned that aircraft and who was experienced in it, lost control during a night takeoff. How many 12,000-hour pilots fail to maintain control during a night takeoff? I'd guess not many. What the official conclusion may have missed is that the extra mental power required to fly that dangerous contraption may have caused that pilot to become overloaded and screw up. Having flown all sorts of rental aircraft ranging from new to pathetic, I know the extra workload found in "risky" airplanes; odd placement of switches, unfamiliar navigation devices, and iffy com panels can be the difference between a fun trip and one that is not. Multiply that risk factor by many times, as would be the case with the "wrecked wreck," and the risk factors went off that pilot's chart. " Turbine Pilot: Taking the Risk Out," by John Sheehan, in the same issue is sage advice.

Stephen Wm. Bilson AOPA 1022155
Chula Vista, California

Making it big time

Mark Twombly's " Pilotage: Making It Big Time" (January Pilot), was a funny reminder of the fragile male ego, mine included. During the late 1960s, I worked at an airline's crew desk where flight crewmembers signed in for duty. One day I was reading a big ad for big watches when a very senior stewardess (that's what they were called back then) came to sign for her flight. She saw the ad, snorted, and then growled, "The bigger the watch, the smaller the pilot's, er, manhood," and then walked away. Ever since, I have worn my rather small single-function watch for all to see.

Mike Reid AOPA 4734408
Pickton, Texas

My comments are directed to Mark Twombly and his column "Making It Big Time". Mr. Twombly, I believe I remember when you started writing articles for AOPA Pilot. I do not think that it is appropriate for you to pass judgment on those of us who make our living as professional pilots, day in and day out. I take specific exception to your comments on pilots that use combined personal digital assistant (PDA)/mobile phones and on pilots with big watches. As a former line pilot for Flight Options, I made great use of the combined PDA/mobile phone capabilities that you mentioned. As you can imagine, fractional flying can be quite dynamic. With numerous last-minute changes, being able to communicate with our nearly 1,000 pilots and to operate our 250-plus aircraft fleet, paperless was quite an advantage. On several occasions, while on a single flying rotation, I had the opportunity to span all four corners of this great country, plus a stop or two outside our borders. While I understand that converting Greenwich Mean Time can be quite easy at times, it sure helps to know which time zone you are currently in. So enjoy your somewhat lax Timex; I'll keep my Breitling B-2. It has a nice digital window in it that always tells me the current time in Greenwich, England, even if I am in my fourth time zone with nine hours of flight time and 14 hours of duty time under my belt for the day, for the seventh consecutive day.

Shane Kelley AOPA 1309379
Trophy Club, Texas

Fixing the notam system

I would like to correct one statement in Thomas B. Haines' article, " Waypoints: Fixing the Notam System," in the January issue of Pilot. In discussing temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) over nuclear power plants, Mr. Haines states, "The FAA, obviously under pressure from the Department of Energy...issued the [nuclear power plant] TFRs." Although a common mistake, the Department of Energy does not regulate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. This authority belongs to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Also, in the post-9/11 environment, the NRC did not pressure the FAA to implement temporary flight restrictions over nuclear power plants. The NRC administers its authority in a deliberate and appropriate fashion. The NRC recognized the limited safety value that nuclear-power-plant TFRs provided and worked with other security agencies and departments to implement other, more beneficial security measures. Although the FAA was under pressure from security entities to implement TFRs over nuclear power plants, it was not because of pressure from the NRC or the Department of Energy.

Jack R. Davis
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

AOPA's sources at the FAA during that time cited the NRC as an advocate for TFRs over nuclear facilities. — The Editors

I read with surprise and some confusion a comment in your article in the January issue of Pilot. It seems a member asserted that the FAA has determined that only an approach flown in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) to minimums is loggable. I read another article in IFR magazine that stated that the approach is loggable if, when cleared for the approach, IMC exists in the final approach corridor. For me, the first stipulation challenges a test of reasonableness. The ceiling is, by definition, very rarely at minimums. It is most often either below, in which case a missed approach is required, or above, in which case the requirement to fly in IMC to minimums cannot be met. This would leave virtually all of the approaches I fly, even those to 250 feet agl (50 feet above decision altitude) on an ILS, as unloggable if the requirement as stated is correct. This would, however, be good news for flight instructors, as the number of instrument proficiency checks would rise dramatically. Could you please investigate and clarify?

Doug Watson AOPA 1365826
Bend, Oregon

AOPA's interpretation of the regulation is based on a 1992 letter from the FAA chief counsel's office, which notes that approaches to be logged must be flown to minimum descent altitude or decision altitude. Because the letter doesn't specifically address weather conditions, we could imagine a situation where an FAA official could violate a pilot for logging an approach not flown to minimums in instrument conditions or under the hood, as impractical as such a flight might be. The point is, be careful when logging approaches to include only those that could reasonably be considered flown in IMC or under the hood. — The Editors

We welcome your comments. Address your letters to: Editor, AOPA Pilot, 421 Aviation Way, Frederick, Maryland 21701. Send e-mail to [email protected]. Include your full name, address, and AOPA number on all correspondence, including e-mail. Letters will be edited for length and style.