Research always pays off
Nor can it hurt to question a pilot who has been there concerning what someone arriving on a first visit should expect. Features that don't appear in flight-data texts, or are not possible to show on a chart, might still be worth knowing. If a pilot you respect says of the Waterbury-Oxford, Connecticut, airport, "There are power lines on the final approach to Runway 36. They're not really very high, but on final they look pretty high," it could take the surprise out of your arrival. If the sectional chart depiction of the Kingston-Ulster airport (20N) in New York suggests a very close relationship between the final approach to Runway 33 and a bridge across the Hudson River, ask someone who knows before you go. Scout up a photograph if possible. Also note, as published in AOPA's Airport Directory, that the airport has two displaced thresholds, preferred arrival and departure runways, a 350-foot mean sea level hill a half-mile to the northeast listed as an obstacle, a caution to avoid housing at the end of Runway 15, and limitations on hours of flight training. A well-informed pilot will fare better here than someone who simply draws a line on a chart and takes off.
Even after doing your research, don't assume that all the hazards you know about are all the hazards that an airport can dish out. At the airport in Athens, Georgia, birds and deer are listed as "obstructions." Pilots are cautioned about a stack off Runway 9 and trees at each end of Runway 2/20. Nothing is said about a 40-foot drop-off that might swallow you up if you get lost while taxiing at night. But that's what happened to a 117-hour pilot there on October 28, 2001, seriously injuring the pilot and a passenger.
The flight, in a Beech Sundowner, had arrived at the airport during daylight. The pilot requested taxi clearance for departure about 40 minutes later, when it was dark, according to the National Transportation Safety Board report of the accident. The report's narrative shows how easy it is to become confused once conditions change. "After restarting the engine, he made radio contact with ground control and was directed to taxi to Runway 27. He said he missed the turn to Taxiway B-3, was then directed to Taxiway A-4, and held short of Runway 27. After completing the run-up and checklist, he contacted ground control. He said, '.....it was so dark I moved over so that the taxi lights were right on top of the yellow centerline. I looked ahead into total darkness for the runway.' He said he had to look down to continue on the taxi centerline, then up to search for the runway, then down to taxi centerline. As he continued to search for the runway, air traffic control (ATC) shouted, 'Stop...Stop.' He applied the brakes; went over the 40-foot drop-off, impacting nose first; and nosed over, coming to rest upside down." The pilot had eight hours of night operations, according to the report.
The onset of dark and a lack of runway lighting became the imperatives for a pilot of a Piper Cherokee and two pilot-rated passengers to shun dessert and make a prompt departure after dinner from a private airstrip in Arkansas on October 8, 2002. At this airport, Gastons (3M0) in Lakeview, Arkansas, departures are to be on Runway 6; arrivals on Runway 24. The basic description of the accident reads as follows: "Numerous witnesses reported the airplane did not accelerate normally during the takeoff roll, and it took nearly all of the 3,200-foot turf runway to lift off. The witnesses then described a slow, nose-high climb. The airplane flew to the east along a river before turning to left prior to encountering power lines. The airplane impacted the bluff, and erupted in flames." The site was southeast of the airport.
However, numerous questions were left unanswered. One of the pilots was a flight instructor and the aircraft owner. Another was a private pilot and mechanic; the third, a student pilot who had recently resumed flying. It was unclear who was seated where. Staff at the pilot-owner's place of employment said he had been seeking to remedy a "low power problem" with the aircraft, but he had later said it was fixed. This maintenance was not reflected in logbook entries, but other records, according to the NTSB, "indicated that on September 18, 2002, the flight instructor purchased two intake gaskets (part number 71973), and then on October 4, 2002, four more of the same gaskets were purchased."
It was mentioned above that the accident site was southeast of the airport. The following information about local custom concerning the airport was included in the accident report: "According to the A/FD, pilots are instructed to land on Runway 24 and to take off on Runway 6. Local pilots told investigators that the normal departure procedure is to take off from Runway 6, then turn northeast and fly down a valley that paralleled the runway, instead of flying along the White River, which has steep bluffs along the river edge and high power lines that cross the river. Review of comments placed on AirNav's Web site revealed two cautions regarding the airport area. One of the cautions warned of the 'high wires on left base when landing on [Runway] 24.' The other caution recommended studying the airport area because there is steep hill on the east side of the airport and power lines. According to acquaintances of the instructor pilot, he had flown into and out of that airport before."
These cautions would certainly have been valuable for a pilot to add to his preparation for a first-time arrival at an airport situated in challenging terrain. But as illustrated by another accident that occurred nearby only six days later, situational awareness should never be surrendered in favor of supposedly superior information. On that day, a high-time airline transport pilot flying a Beech Bonanza thought he had Gastons in sight, and was on final approach. But Gastons wasn't where he thought it was. He was five miles south of it.
Said the NTSB summary: "The 37,000-hour pilot reported that he was en route to 3M0 when he saw a pasture that appeared to be his destination. The pilot reported the he 'observed this large grass field from 20 miles away, it looked like the right place until I saw the fence which I tried to avoid.' The pilot further reported that he made two passes over the field before landing. While landing to the north, he saw a fence and pulled up to clear it. The airplane cleared the fence and touched down approximately 600 feet from the end of the field. The airplane continued through another fence, slid sideward through two trees before coming to rest upright in a driveway located in the front yard of the house owned by the property owner."
Also included in the report were these comments by the pilot: "The pilot reported that he had never been to 3M0 before and the description he was given was that Gastons was a field "near [a] river with houses lined up on [the] side of [the] field." 3M0 features a single turf runway (6/24), reported as 3,200 feet long by 55 feet wide. The airport is located next to a river and outlined by white day markers.
And, "The pilot reported on the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1/2) that the accident could have been avoided had he been 'given a better description of Gastons and if he landed in the other direction.'"
A pilot's burden of information gathering is spelled out in the federal aviation regulations and drilled and practiced extensively in training. Whether you have 37 hours of flight time or 37,000, these various incidents show that information is only useful if the pilot who gathers it recognizes its limitations and proceeds with appropriate caution.
A new feature of AOPA's Airport Directory Online can help. Select an airport to research, then click on an accompanying link to AOPA Air Safety Foundation accident reports at that airport. Many of the accidents have causes unrelated to the airport environment itself, but now and then, some feature of the airport that can take advantage of an unsuspecting pilot's vulnerability may be illustrated in the case histories.
For the best information possible when heading off to a new airport that your research shows might prove tricky, find out who the local pros are, and call ahead. They've seen it all, and they know what works--and what doesn't.
Dan Namowitz is an aviation writer and flight instructor. A pilot since 1985 and an instructor since 1990, he resides in Maine.
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