I enjoyed your review of Flyboys in the October issue (" 'Flyboys': The Passion of Tony Bill"). Thanks for explaining the tracer fire and a few of the other details behind the film. I was a bit surprised to hear of the film's extensive aviation know-how because some details I felt were suspicious, such as the dirigible, which attacks Paris, shown flying in formation with its fighter support — I didn't know the dirigibles were that fast. One scene shows a German Fokker pilot falling out of his aircraft. Has that ever been documented? And I noted a couple of aircraft lose a wing and proceed to roll toward the remaining wing.
Alton K. Marsh writes: Few films have three pilots on the set, including the director. But pilots were not a part of the special-effects company personnel in England. Looks like you have caught a few items in the film that could have used a pilot's touch. Hollywood is a very segmented industry where unions protect the rights of different workers to have their say on the film. As for the German Fokker pilot falling out, yes, I have heard of that happening. In my research, I know that some pilots preferred to jump to their death in the event of fire.
I enjoyed the article and saw the movie a couple days ago. You mentioned Eugene Bullard, who was the black pilot (called "Skinner" in the movie, I believe). Did the movie intentionally not use any of the real pilots' names? Also, I don't think anyone named Bullard was one of the 38 members. I have a list of the 38 names on the letterhead of a letter from the Lafayette Escadrille Corp. sent to my dad by Edward F. Hinkle, who was one of the members, in 1943.
The article on the filming of the motion picture Flyboys (October Pilot) was entertaining, but it contained an inaccuracy masquerading as an "accurate touch." The black pilot Eugene "Jacques" Bullard never flew with the Lafayette Escadrille because he did experience discrimination in France from American pilots. Bullard joined the French Foreign Legion as an infantryman and earned his way into the French flying corps. Once he earned his wings as, historically, the first person of African descent to gain recognized pilot status, Bullard was assigned to the Escadrille Spad 93, a unit of French pilots. There was no American involvement in the unique story of Eugene Bullard except for the rejection of his application to join the Lafayette Escadrille.
It's a few days after the high-profile accident in New York City. I am sitting in Grand Central Terminal as the only operations manager on duty, and during lunch I read " Technique: When Good Pilots Go Bad" (October Pilot). The article suggests, "Get that power off." I believe that the thing that gets you when you are cranking and banking is the cross-control stall. You wrote of the spiral, which could become a spin. The frightening thing is that a cross-control stall from a spiral could cause you to reverse direction at the moment of stall. Take a docile Cessna 172 and try banking to 45 degrees left turn with your feet on the floor, pulling back hard. Before you could say @#$%&, the aircraft would have flipped to the right just as you entered a cross-control accelerated stall. At low altitude this is deadly. A low-time pilot, or a pilot not current, is quite prone to this maneuver. An instructor not expecting this would be along for the ride.
Thank you for the article " Flying Together: Couples in the Cockpit" (October Pilot), and for tackling this very human side of flying and providing various approaches to make it successful. My husband and I were married only three years when we decided to buy into a 1957 Piper Tri-Pacer and learn to fly together. The economics proved beneficial, as did the positive support we gave each other throughout our ground school and flying lessons. I approached flying as a way to accomplish something that would make my new husband proud of me. The trouble in paradise began when he failed his first attempt at the checkride; I passed. It did not help that I got more attention for being a woman pilot. It was just people's stereotypical response, but it created more cracks in his ego. I am sorry I did not understand that earlier; I'd have made sure he knew that I respected his ability and dedication to flying. I never told him how much I appreciated that he always made it home safely throughout 20 years of business commuting in the mountains of Montana. Our story did not have a fairy-tale ending, but someone got a very good deal on a well-maintained Turbo Lance.
I read with interest Thomas B. Haines' recent column (" Waypoints: Managing the Pilot/Controller Relationship," October Pilot). I started flying a Champ at age 14, went on to fly P-3s, and retired in 2003 with 28 years as an en route controller with time at Los Angeles and Seattle centers. What many pilots don't realize is that most restrictions and routes issued by a controller are not his restrictions, but are what is required by the next sector/facility down the line. A controller's job is the safe and efficient flow of air traffic. A controller would like to have every aircraft go through his sector with a minimum of fuss and as quickly as possible. Imagine, as a controller, the frustration of having to issue a route you don't like and don't agree with, and having to take the heat for it.
For example: Los Angeles Tower says it has to have Runway 24/25 traffic come at the airport a certain way. Los Angeles Approach then says it must have aircraft at this altitude on this route to do it. Long Beach Tower says that means it can't get its traffic the way it needs it. So the plan gets compromised. Then the new plan causes Burbank traffic to be affected, which causes Van Nuys, Long Beach, and Santa Barbara traffic to be routed differently. The result is that a general aviation aircraft from Santa Barbara to San Diego goes east to Riverside to go south. The route comes out on the flight plan from the computer and the controller has to issue it. If you do not like or do not understand a routing, call the facility involved and find out why the route is required and if there are any options. Complaining to controllers does no good, as they have no choice most of the time.
I'll give Thomas Haines the benefit of the doubt that he didn't recognize that his statement regarding how "rewarding" the job of an air traffic controller is was incredibly self-absorbed. He tools along in his aircraft, moving from point A to point B safely, all the while marveling at his ability to manage that feat with incredible deftness and amazing skill. Meanwhile, the air traffic controller is responsible for managing ever-more crowded airspace with the responsibility for getting 10 or 20 aircraft safely from point A to point B. It obviously didn't occur to Haines that since that air traffic controller was concentrating on ensuring the safety of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of lives, he or she might not have had the time, or the inclination, to answer a question from a self-absorbed pilot straining to manage his single aircraft. As someone who has experienced both responsibilities, I can tell you that as the controller, it was not my primary responsibility to critique pilots, during flight, about the intricacies and methodology behind the safe movement of massive amounts of tin through crowded airspace. If you are really interested in "why," the proper thing for you to do is, once on the ground, to give the local ATC a call. I'm sure there is a bureaucrat available to answer the question with nothing more pressing to do than warm his coffee. I have not been an air traffic controller for decades, but I can tell you that controllers do an incredible job, for insufficient pay. They deal with massive egos and they do so with unbelievable patience. We take for granted each and every day that hundreds of thousands of human beings are moved safely through crowded skies.
Reading " Pilotage: The Best Policy" by Mark R. Twombly (October Pilot) gave me a glimmer of hope that I am not the most incompetent doofus that ever sat in a [Piper Twin] Comanche. I had a Twin Comanche about 20 years ago and currently fly a Cessna 180 and have recently purchased a twin that I have yet to fly. With somewhat more than 20,000 hours mostly in Boeing 727s, which I seemed to be able to get on the ground smoothly for the most part, most of my landings in the [Twin] Comanches could be better described as "arrivals." I have tried full flaps, no flaps, fast, slow, 50 pounds of shot in the baggage compartment, all without consistent results. I am determined that I am going to figure this thing out. But then again why should I be able to figure it out when so many others — better pilots than I — have not. I have been reading with great interest the literature on speed brakes. Somewhere I read that there was no prohibition against using them in the landing phase. Having flown large aircraft with spoilers, I know for a fact that you can stop the float and assist the last few inches of descent by carefully deploying a smidgen of spoiler (don't ask me how I know this). It seems to me that out there somewhere there has to be a growing body of evidence concerning the operation of [Twin] Comanches with Precise Flight speed brakes. Maybe we can get a dialogue going?
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