Should these traits be tracked?
What makes the narrow-escape stories of the veterans so gripping is that it isn't just one malfunction or surprise that made a flight memorable, but rather an incredible series of problems that compounded until the flight's successful conclusion became unlikely--even miraculous.
You say you're not the type to be tempted by incautious solutions to fly-or-not-fly decisions? Bravo. But the day may be coming when your susceptibility to risk will be measured statistically.
A flight in a Beechcraft J35 Bonanza that began on the night of February 11, 2004, would have made a perfect story for an old salt. It had all the ingredients. We even have the pilot's description of the event as it unfolded, but not because he survived to tell us--he didn't. What we have is the air traffic control voice recording made during the last moments of the flight, which ended when the aircraft "collided with tree-covered terrain following a loss of control during a missed approach, about 14 miles north-northwest of the Pensacola Regional Airport, Pensacola, Florida," said the National Transportation Safety Board accident summary. This is a report about risk.
The 500-hour pilot was flying on a night instrument flight plan, but he was not an instrument-rated pilot; he had been training for the rating for only a few weeks. The instructor who had been training him told investigators that the pilot had practiced flying his Florida-to-New Orleans route on a personal computer using flight simulation software.
If there was less to the pilot's qualifications than met the eye, the same could be said for the 1958 airplane that he flew. The flight instructor "reported to the NTSB that on a previous flight in the accident airplane, they encountered a fuel transfer problem that involved the right wingtip tank. In a statement he wrote, in part: 'When we selected the right tip tank, the engine began to cough and lose power. We immediately selected the main tank, and the engine ran smooth again.' According to the flight instructor, the pilot had his mechanic lubricate the fuel selector valve assembly, and the fuel system operated normally. A review of the maintenance records failed to disclose any maintenance entry correcting the deficiency noted by the flight instructor."
The first sign that the flight was in trouble came over the airwaves. "According to personnel at the Pensacola Terminal Radar Approach Control (Tracon), the accident pilot contacted the Pensacola Tracon specialist on duty about 2125 CST, and requested that his IFR flight plan be 'amended.' When the tracon specialist inquired as to what the amendment was, the pilot reported that he was low on fuel and he needed to land at Pensacola."
The pilot was low on fuel because he could not gain access to fuel in a tip tank. Three attempts to execute an ILS approach to Pensacola followed. Weather at Pensacola was reported at one point during the sequence as two miles visibility in mist and a 200-foot overcast ceiling, with winds from the southeast at 12 knots. On the second approach the Bonanza came within two miles of the runway and was cleared to land. But the pilot executed a missed approach. Throughout, vertical and horizontal excursions were interspersed with the pilot's preoccupation with his fuel problem."
During the third attempt to establish the accident pilot on a stabilized approach for the ILS approach to Runway 17, "the accident pilot said: '040, Eight-Niner-Delta...I'm outta gas....we're on fumes here.' The Tracon specialist responded: 'Bonanza Eight-Niner-Delta roger, turn right heading 090. The accident pilot said: '090, Eight-Niner-Delta.'
"The Tracon specialist then asked the pilot: 'Bonanza Eight-Niner-Delta say altitude.' The only response from the accident pilot is: '....two...' The Tracon specialist: 'Bonanza Eight-Niner-Delta, maintain 1,700, over.' At 2216, the accident pilot told the Tracon specialist, in part, 'I can't, I can't...I've lost it....'" No further radio contact was received from the accident airplane, and the airplane disappeared from the Tracon specialist's radar screen."
The probable accident cause: "The pilot's improper decision to conduct flight that exceeded his demonstrated skills/ability. Also causal was his failure to properly execute the instrument approach. Contributing factors were low ceiling, fog, and the pilot's lack of the appropriate certification for the flight."
Same risk, different variables, six days after the Bonanza crash. A 158-hour pilot with 11 hours of simulated instrument training and 12 minutes of actual instrument time had a decision to make about flying with a passenger from Iola, Kansas, to St. Charles, Missouri, in a Piper PA28-180 single-engine aircraft. He contacted the Wichita Automated Flight Service station and asked for a weather briefing for a VFR flight. "The briefer advised the pilot that VFR flight was not recommended and that an advisory for IFR conditions was in effect for the eastern two-thirds of Kansas and western Missouri," said the NTSB report. "The briefer added, 'The problem in that area where you are there is very limited weather reporting...except for Emporia and Chanute and...they're just drastically different.' The pilot replied: 'Well we're pretty close to Chanute so I think I'll be OK.'" Chanute's weather was clear below 12,000 feet agl and six miles visibility in mist. The pilot did not file a flight plan, and there was no further record of contact.
Two witness reports fill in the blanks. One, located five miles from the departure airport, described conditions as dark and "unbelievably foggy" when an aircraft overflew her house. Another recalled that it was foggy; however, he was not sure of the visibility. He commented that there was a thin layer of ice on his vehicle's windshield as well.
The flight ended predictably. "In the 1-1/2 minutes immediately prior to the final radar data point, the aircraft entered a marked right turn. The radar track depicted was consistent with a gradually decreasing turn radius." The probable cause: "Spatial disorientation experienced by the non-instrument-rated pilot due to a lack of visual references and his subsequent failure to maintain control of the aircraft. Contributing factors were the pilot's intentional flight into adverse weather conditions, the overcast cloud layer, low lighting conditions (night), and fog."
Could the time be coming when data collected about pilots, such as answers given on knowledge tests, is used as a profiling tool?
Pilots, with their paper trail of knowledge test application forms, flight-test application forms, medical certificate application forms, logbooks, and so forth, are a gold mine of data. They reveal themselves through their actions--that is, their behavior as reflected in statistical analysis of accidents and, interestingly enough, of non-accidents too.
A comparison of a batch of accidents in search of shared elements confirms that certain trends, such as the predictably highly fatal nature of accidents involving penetration of adverse weather, remain constant. But accident reports do not reveal what other pilots were doing in the same area at about the same time, or differentiate between flights that were successful and those that weren't. Nor is there mention of whether the pilots who flew safely that day scored better, long ago, on their aviation knowledge examinations than did the pilots whose flights concluded less fortunately. The notion that pilots are a predictable population, and the history we build can be interpreted to protect us from ourselves, has not gone unnoticed in officialdom.
The NTSB advanced this idea in a set of recommendations contained in a recent Safety Study Report of risk factors associated with weather-related general aviation accidents. The contrary view, advanced in response by AOPA, is that individual pilots have unique strengths and weaknesses, goals, and aircraft-specific training needs. Recurrent training performed to current regulatory standards but tailored to those individual needs is working, as witness reductions in fatal weather accidents over the past six years. "Pilots have always believed in safety, and I believe there is an even stronger safety culture now than in past decades," wrote AOPA Air Safety Foundation Executive Director Bruce Landsberg in the executive summary of the 2004 Nall Report of Accident Trends and Factors for 2003.
Perhaps the data gathered will serve their best purpose if they prompt pilots to critique their own weaknesses. Ultimately, what's important is for you to understand your risk factors, and minimize them every time you fly.
Dan Namowitz is an aviation writer and flight instructor. A pilot since 1985 and an instructor since 1990, he resides in Maine.
