Aeronautical decision making and situational awareness
You'll also find ADM listed among the 11 special emphasis areas in the introduction of the Practical Test Standards for the private and commercial pilot certificates. But don't mistake the obscure placement of this language in the PTS to suggest that it is mere boilerplate. The 11 special emphasis items are the sacred safety secrets of good piloting on checkrides and beyond. They are under constant review by the designated examiner during your flight test, and you must remember to keep them under review when the only judge evaluating your flying is you. As the PTS discussion itself informs: "Although these areas may not be specifically addressed under each task, they are essential to flight safety and will be evaluated during the practical test. In all instances, the applicant's actions will relate to the complete situation."
Long before a student pilot should start pondering the PTS, he or she should become familiar with the handbook's now-expansive treatment of ADM. Here one finds the idea that "problem definition is the first step in the decision making process." Misdiagnose the problem, or fixate on an unproven diagnosis of what is going wrong, and you can distract yourself from other piloting responsibilities. An obvious example, which persists to this day, is a pilot experiencing an engine failure in a multiengine aircraft but wrongly identifying the failed engine. The result can be catastrophic instead of merely disruptive.
The ADM text discusses how to select a course of action after a problem has been defined. "The expected outcome of each possible action should be considered and the risks assessed before deciding on a response to the situation."
Here's a twist: What if there is no problem to solve, or if it is a problem of the pilot's own manufacture? That is, what if the solution becomes the problem? Seeking to avoid overflying an obstacle on the final approach to a short grass field, a pilot opts instead for a tailwind component on landing. Employing a function of the airplane's GPS receiver, another pilot diverts to the nearest airport and has trouble there. Expecting to land on a nice long runway, a third pilot encounters a shorter one instead, and things go wrong. Each of these events begins with some sort of "problem" to solve, but as the saying goes, the cure turns out to be worse than the disease--examples of ADM where it lives.
On June 4, 2004, a Cessna 175 (a Cessna 172 variant with a geared Continental GO-300 engine, produced from 1958 to 1962) nosed over after landing at a private airstrip owned by a commercial pilot in Blissfield, Michigan. A National Transportation Safety Board accident summary gives the sequence of events. "The pilot reported he was landing to the west on his 1,300 foot by 100 foot grass airstrip when the accident occurred. He stated there are high-tension power lines on the west end of the airstrip so if the winds are 5 knots or less, he lands to the west so he does not have to cross the lines on approach.
"The pilot stated the winds at his departure airport, 6 minutes away, were from 050 degrees at 6 knots," the summary continued. "He stated he landed a bit farther down the airstrip than normal and he attempted to ground loop the airplane when he realized he was not going to be able to stop. The pilot stated that due to the lack of friction because of the grass, he was unable to ground loop the airplane and it continued off the end of the airstrip. The airplane nosed over when it contacted a 6-foot-deep drainage ditch."
The NTSB determined the probable cause of this accident as a combination of pilot decision making and other factors: "The pilot selected the wrong runway on which to land, which resulted in exceeding the proper touchdown point during landing. Factors associated with the accident were the tailwind condition and the drainage ditch which the airplane contacted."
On June 23, 2005, an instrument-rated private pilot was practicing takeoffs and landings in a Cessna T-206 at several New Jersey airports. He departed Atlantic City, landed twice at Ocean City, and then proceeded to Millville, where he landed, checked the weather, then departed for Lumberton. That's when he made another decision, according to the NTSB account of what happened next. It activated an error chain that had begun long before the day's flight.
"About 5 minutes after departing Millville, the pilot decided that he wanted to land at a different airport than he had originally intended, and used the 'nearest' function on the airplane's global positioning system (GPS) receiver to locate the nearest airport, which was Rudy's Airport. He then examined his sectional chart and found that the airport was a public use, turf airport, and subsequently elected to perform a landing there.
"The pilot entered the traffic pattern on the left downwind leg and landed on runway 08. He described the landing as 'bumpy,' but not unlike any other soft field landings he had performed in the past. As the airplane slowed during the landing rollout, the nose landing gear encountered soft sand, and the airplane nosed over.
"An FAA inspector examined the airplane and determined that it had incurred substantial damage during the accident. The inspector also examined the pilot's sectional aeronautical chart, and found that it was valid through February 20, 2003. The inspector also stated that the airport windsock had been removed, and that large orange 'X' markings had been placed at both ends of the runway.
"A notam published by the FAA regarding Rudy's Airport stated the following: 05/001 25N AP CLSD PERM."
Probable cause determination: "The pilot's inadequate preflight planning, which resulted in his decision to land at a closed airport."
A smallish runway, when a longer one is expected to show up, and a nonstandard landing configuration can spell problems. Throw in identical pairs of runway bearings and the presence nearby of a prominent visual landmark (the 14,162-foot Mount Shasta) and an error chain can begin. This proved to be the case on June 2, 2004, in Dunsmuir, California, for the pilot of a Piper PA-28-181 flying from Novato to Weed.
The NTSB report explains how the difficulties got started: "According to the pilot's written statement, she terminated her VFR flight plan after passing Redding's very high frequency omni-directional range (VOR) navigation system. When she cancelled her flight plan, she was informed that she was about 30 miles south of her destination airport (Weed is approximately 58 miles north-northwest of the Redding VOR). As the pilot proceeded along her route, she noticed an airport with the runway numbers 32/14, which happened to be the same runway numbers for Weed.
"The pilot overflew the airport, and thought that it was her planned destination airport. She landed the airplane, but could not stop the airplane prior to the departure end. The airplane departed the runway, overran a ditch, and impacted a small hill, where it came to rest." The report noted that photographs indicated that the flaps were in the retracted position. It made this observation about landing performance: "Review of the PA-28-181 pilot operating handbook's (POH) landing distance performance chart revealed that the airplane's landing distance (at maximum gross weight with full flaps extended, and the atmospheric conditions experienced by the pilot) should have been no more than 1,100 feet."
When studying ADM, you will be challenged to analyze risk, which the Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge chapter divides into four elements: pilot, airplane, environment, operation. Learn to carry an accurate measure of each element while flying and you have achieved, in the analytical jargon, situational awareness. The handbook discussion states: "When situationally aware, the pilot has an overview of the total operation and is not fixated on one perceived significant factor." Clearly the record shows that this perceived significant factor can be something as simple as knowing whether a nearby airport is closed before you land there, or making certain that you're landing at the proper airport. ADM presents a wide-ranging set of variables. That's why your grasp of decision-making comes in for special emphasis on a checkride.
Dan Namowitz is an aviation writer and flight instructor. A pilot since 1985 and an instructor since 1990, he resides in Maine.
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