February 12, 2009, will go down as a historic day in the airline industry. Because the industry's rules, regulations, and procedures are defined by accidents, it's no surprise that the fatal crash of Continental Connection Flight 3047 near Buffalo, New York, will have long-term effects. The flight, operated by Colgan Air, is the deadliest U.S. accident in seven years; 50 people were killed.
But it is an indication of the airlines' recent safety record - and even an indication of the priorities of a new labor-centric FAA administrator - that an otherwise vanilla accident will go down as the one that affected more change in an airline pilot's way of life than any in decades.
The FAA has taken extraordinary steps in recent weeks to initiate changes to pilot training, airline oversight, pilot duty times, and even the checkride history of airline applicants, simply because of the speculative actions of the captain and first officer in the hours, days, and even years leading up to the accident. All of this prior to the National Transportation Safety Board final report, typically the FAA's starting point for rule or procedure changes.
But new FAA chief Randy Babbitt isn't waiting for the NTSB, and instead has made the accident and subsequent fallout a primary focus since taking office in late May. The agency's actions began in mid-June when a group of airline and union representatives developed a series of initial ideas to improve pilot training and other safety-related issues at the first of what's expected to be a series of meetings through early fall. "I want you to devise tangible, constructive actions that will make an immediate difference in how we operate and how we fly," Babbitt told those who had gathered for the meeting. "Let me be clear here. We need to make moves that we can adopt right away."
Included in the discussion was talk of a mentoring partnership between mainline carriers and their regional partners, which presumably employ lower-time pilots; starting a review board to deal with pilots who are believed to have violated cockpit rules; and more. Subsequently, the FAA released an "Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan" that contains eight major items the agency plans to address. They include: rule changes relating to fatigue, more focus on operations inspections, additional guidance on airline training, more access to pilot records for hiring, the adoption of professional ethics standards, a mentoring program, and additional rules on crew training. Each of these action items has the potential to significantly change an airline pilot's lifestyle in the future, but rules related to fatigue, pilot records, and crew training are potentially groundbreaking.
There's no question that factors leading up to the Colgan accident, be they real or perceived, are driving the changes. In the days following the crash, it was revealed that First Officer Rebecca Shaw routinely commuted from her home in the Pacific Northwest to Newark, where she was based. Although this practice is common among airline pilots, media reports and Congress latched onto the news, and called for the FAA to do something about pilot fatigue issues. Airline pilots have been saying for years that a maximum duty day of more than 15 hours is much too long, but a lack of recent accidents where fatigue was a contributing factor meant the issue hadn't received its necessary scrutiny. The Colgan accident seems to have finally changed that, as the action plan calls for rulemaking to begin in early September that will bring a "science-based" approach to flight and rest times.
Even more sensational to the public and Congress were reports that Capt. Marvin Renslow had failed numerous checkrides during pilot training, and didn't appear to react properly to the airplane's stall indications. The Pilot Records Improvement Act (PRIA), passed in 1996, requires airlines to request a pilot applicant's records going back five years. Renslow's actions that night, combined with his history of checkride failures, brought accusations that the captain may have been improperly trained for his duties. In its action plan, the FAA is asking Congress for "appropriate amendments" to PRIA, and in the meantime requesting carriers ask pilots for full disclosure of their records, including failures.
Although PRIA has been around for more than 10 years, will the accident affect a pilot's ability to get hired if his full record is obtained and shows multiple failures? Conventional wisdom says that even if it doesn't become regulation that a carrier must disqualify a pilot for employment after multiple failures, few are going to want that sort of public relations liability.
The cockpit voice recorder has also proven to be a damning piece of evidence. FAA regulations prohibit nonessential communication below 10,000 feet - the so-called Sterile Cockpit Rule. But the voices of Renslow and Shaw clearly indicate the two failed to follow the regulation, including a portion where Shaw commented on her lack of experience with icing conditions. As a result, the FAA has asked the various pilot unions to develop a set of professional standards and ethics dealing with behavior, standards of conduct, and overall fitness to fly. For their part, the unions seem to agree.
Finally, although begun prior to the accident, the FAA is involved in a rulemaking process that would require airline pilots be trained with simulators. It is a minor point for most carriers, yet it highlights the lack of training standards in an industry the public believes is highly regulated and controlled. More important, it will require all carriers to implement programs that have proven to be effective in the past. That the rulemaking is occurring parallel to the other action items, and Renslow's actions brought questions on the caliber of his training, is just a lucky break for the FAA and a free pass to allow the agency to implement the regulation as it sees fit.
What does all this mean for the aspiring airline pilot? The job market will become increasingly more competitive and may be closed to those with a questionable past. But for those who make the cut, it's all but assured that duty and rest times will change in favor of those pilots who toil for 15 hours a day making just above minimum wage. If only no one had to die for such a change to occur, maybe the agency could effect real change.
Deputy Editor Ian J. Twombly is a CFII.