General aviation airports are changing. Gone are the days when an old hand with a practiced eye could scan all the aircraft on the ramp and make precise identifications of each with the briefest glance. Amateur-built and new Light Sport manufactured models are in the ascendancy, sending airplane-watchers to their computers to get the goods on that brand-spanking-new ship that just taxied in.
As this new fleet and pilot community thrive, they are differentiating themselves in some ways from the overall pilot population. How do amateur-built aircraft and their pilots simply mirror general aviation at large? What are the differences worth knowing for someone who one day might become a member of this growing demographic category?
For now, there are several differences worth noting in the type and frequency of the accidents that are showing up. In this column the relevant question is always, “How can that issue be addressed in training?” The answer, to quote an old song, is that the fundamental things apply. Getting the word out now may avert underlying problems—and help improve the accident statistics—later. That’s because the number of accidents involving amateur-built aircraft is steadily growing. Lethality is also higher than for type-certificated airplanes.
Details emerge in the two most recent Joseph T. Nall reports, published by the AOPA Air Safety Foundation and available online. The 2008 Nall Report, which analyzed data through 2007, observed, “Total amateur-built accidents continue to increase. The accident factor distribution is not markedly different from that in manufactured airplanes, with the exception of a somewhat higher proportion of maneuvering accidents.”
The recently released 2009 report’s statistics brought the focus in closer. “Amateur-built aircraft continued to suffer dramatically higher accident rates than type-certificated aircraft due, in part, to greater numbers of mechanical failures and unexplained losses of engine power,” it reported. “In 2008, 228 amateur-built fixed-wing aircraft were involved in 226 distinct accidents, the same numbers as in 2007. This represents 18 percent of all non-commercial fixed-wing accident aircraft, the highest proportion in the past 10 years, during which time that proportion has steadily increased.”
And, “2008 saw the highest numbers of fatal accidents and individual fatalities in the past decade, and more total accidents than any year except 2007. The 27-percent lethality rate in these accidents was 10 full percentage points higher than that of accidents in type-certificated airplanes.”
Does something sound familiar? Engine failure and losses of control while maneuvering—that is, buzzing, in some cases—are still making the accident-data headlines. Together, said the Nall Report, “They accounted for more than one-third (34 percent) of all accidents in amateur-built airplanes, almost double the 18 percent seen in the fleet as a whole and two and a half times the 14-percent share in the manufactured sector."
The statistics are not in yet for 2009. But the National Transportation Safety Board has determined probable cause in numerous accidents that can be instructive to today’s pilot. The NTSB found that despite many years of experience with his aircraft, a pilot’s inadequate fuel examination during a preflight inspection caused the engine of his tandem Dreyer Starduster to quit on June 15, 2009, at Cowlesville, New York. The pilot had estimated a main-tank fuel load of 11 gallons based on “the quantity on the fuel gauge reading and his nine years experience with the airplane.” However he “did not ‘stick’ the tank.” He and the front-seat occupant performed some maneuvers at 3,000 feet, said the accident report.
Then, “the pilot-owner advanced the throttle to return to the airport, but the engine remained at what he thought was “low power” with “engine sound continuous, perhaps just above idle.”
The pilot-owner established a glide, activated the fuel boost pump, moved the fuel selector to the auxiliary tank, checked both magnetos, and tried various throttle settings before advancing the throttle to full and returning the fuel selector to the main tank.”
He made a forced landing in a cornfield, but “upon touchdown, the landing gear sheared and the airplane nosed over.” This part of his post-accident observations won’t surprise veteran readers of accident reports: “The major error I committed was trusting the…fuel quantity indicated and not refueling the aircraft prior to this flight.”
Fuel system design, including the absence of a fuel selector mechanism, came in for NTSB comment after a June 5, 2009, engine-stoppage accident involving a Garrett Rans S-6ES in Williamsburg, Michigan. So did a decision not to refuel, and the builder’s craftsmanship at installing some wires. “The amateur-built airplane departed on the cross-country flight with 12 gallons of fuel. The left and right wing tanks contained five and seven gallons of fuel, respectively. The outbound flight leg was completed without any reported problems. The pilot did not refuel before departing on the return flight. On the return flight, about 8 miles from the destination airport, the airplane experienced a total loss of engine power. The pilot was unable to restart the engine and subsequently performed a forced landing into a forest clearing,” it said.
Absent a selector, the two fuel lines joined in a T-fitting. After the forced landing, however, one tank was empty while the other still contained a few gallons of fuel.
How could that be? “According to the pilot/builder, he finished installing wingtip navigation and strobe lights about 1.4 hours of flight time before the accident. During the light installation, he routed and secured the associated electrical wiring in the same area as the fuel tank output lines. The pilot/builder stated that he may have tightened the fuel line cable-tie while he installed the navigation/strobe lights.” Probable cause: “The pilot/builder’s improper installation of the fuel line cable-tie, which resulted in fuel starvation and the loss of engine power.”
Preflight inspections, flight planning, fuel management, maneuvering flight: No one is reinventing the wheel as the amateur-built fleet grows, but the safety margin has slipped. Being sharp on your engine-out procedures and having healthy respect for maneuvering hazards is still the ace in the hole. So is an overall serious approach to being a pilot, whether for sport or for any other purpose. It’s been said before but repeating it can’t hurt: Professionalism isn’t just for professionals. It’s for safety.
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