I must disagree with Budd Davisson's statement, "true first action rules [of engine failure]...nose down, change tanks, mixture full rich, boost pump on. These are givens" ("Emergency Practice," July 2011 Flight Training).
A useful teaching technique is the notion that "Engine failure is as simple as A-B-C." A is for Airspeed. Pitch and trim for best glide. Davisson mentioned nose down but did not elaborate. B is for Best field: the best field to which you can glide. Enter as normal as possible a pattern, then use flaps and final approach speed when able. C is for Cockpit check. If time and altitude are available that's when you go for a restart. Cockpit check also means securing the airplane, if possible. If time and state of mind allow, before shutting off electrical, you might decide to make it A-B-C-D: Declare an emergency: 121.5 on the radio; 7700 on the transponder. Nothing, however, should ever detract from the critical A for Airspeed and overall maintaining control of the aircraft. Off - airport landings are survivable. Stall and spin crashes are not.
Joel Hamm
Bluemont, Virginia
Davisson's nice article is full of good suggestions critical for safety. There's one thing I'd really question. On page 28, it says, "regardless of the type of powerplant malfunction, the tried and true first-action rules still apply to them all: nose down, change tanks, mixture full rich, boost pump on." Full rich would be questionable in some cases. Climbing into or operating at higher altitudes requires leaning of the mixture for proper engine operation. If a pilot forgets to lean in a climb, the engine gradually loses power from failure to lean, in addition to the thinner air. Up at Rocky Mountain elevations and altitudes, it will probably get very critical. In troubleshooting an engine malfunction, the pilot needs to understand that leaning, not enriching, will be what's needed to resolve some problems.
Warren Webb Jr.
Cromwell, Connecticut
Shock and Awe
Whatever point Ian Twombly was trying to make in his editorial, "Diversionary Strategy" ("Right Seat," July 2011 Flight Training), was lost on me because I was alienated by the middle of the first paragraph and read no further. Stating that a student pilot would have performed many thousands of stalls and talked about avoidance at most twice damaged not only his credibility but also that of AOPA. One could not believe anything that followed his opening because of the tone he set. I am shocked the editorial staff allowed such an article to be printed.
I hope he will examine his intentions and writing style along with obtaining the advice of people who have extensive experience in both flying and publication (such as Barry Schiff ).
Richard Edgerton
Seattle, Washington
Erratum
From writer Jack Williams: I made two errors in my "Hot, Humid, and Dangerous" column in the July 2011 issue of Flight Training. The date of the extremely hot and humid day at the Newton, Iowa, Municipal Airport that I used as an example of density altitude in the story was really July 14, 2010, not a month earlier as I wrote. I also used an incorrect figure for the density altitude at 10 a.m. that day when the temperature was 9 degrees cooler than at 2:15 p.m. I should have given the figure as 3,417 feet. Flight Training regrets the errors.
