I read and liked Ian J. Twombly's “The Business of Flight Training” (“Right Seat,” January 2013 Flight Training). I own and operate a flight school—Alpine Flight Training in Eagle, Colorado. The column was refreshing in that it has been one of the few pieces I’ve seen recognizing that there is indeed another side to this story—the business side of making it all work. I believe, however, most people are still not entirely thinking through the problem.
In my opinion, flat-rate training is a bad proposition, but not for most of the reasons I read about. The main issue with flat-rate training is that there is no incentive for the student to work hard. I tried flat-rate training—it worked for some students (natural achievers) and it was a failure for others. In analyzing the results, my observation is that some students go home and read the books, study, and take the endeavor seriously. Others float along. The floaters get away with basically ripping off the flight school. Instead of having a private certificate at 40 to 60 hours, they end up finishing at 100 hours. At the start of the process we explain why we don’t do flat-rate training, then we share our stats—we show we have pilots who complete as low as 43 hours, and others who finish at 80 hours. The difference between the two costs is primarily within their control in terms of their willingness to study, prepare for lessons, and be fully engaged and invested in their goal. I think this is the side of the story that needs to be better communicated.
Loren French
Gypsum, Colorado
I hate to break it to you, but it’s not the money. General aviation is being killed by one thing and one thing only—the instructors. The FBOs usually are great, friendly, helpful and supportive. (I might put the antiquated training fleet as a distant second.) Almost all CFIs are totally unqualified to teach anything. They may be good pilots, but in terms of relating that information to a wide variety of students, they are woefully inadequate. Just imagine them in a private school setting; most wouldn’t last a year before being thrown out.
James Freund
Santa Rosa, California
Ian Twombly’s statement of simulation being the solution is not the best answer. His article on Redbird Skyport (“Big Idea,” January 2013 Flight Training) stated that the average aircraft hours for the private certificate is 42 hours. Not impressive given the unlimited usage of the Redbird sims. Simulators need to be very realistic with motion bases and wraparound visuals to provide a viable substitute for a real aircraft. This technology is not cheap. Even at Redbird it can approach $100,000, and the investment needs to be profitable for the owners who use them in leasebacks to the school or to the school itself.
Most flight school managers/owners have no expertise in financial matters and have no idea how to price revenue streams to realistically achieve positive cash flow over a viable return horizon. Aircraft and simulator leasebacks provide passive losses for tax purposes in most cases, and to properly recover the investment basis would result in rental rates much higher than currently charged in many markets.
Rental rates must be raised to cover the increase in asset technology costs. A realistic payback period would be three to five years. Accordingly, with a return on capital of only 8 percent, it would require at least $2,000 per month in revenue.
The suggestion to allow students unlimited access at no cost is a bad idea for the flight school or the sim owner. If the technology provides benefit, it should also provide revenue in proportion to its use.
Douglas Horn
Westerville, Ohio
Emergency or no?
I just finished reading Scott Olsen’s article on medical emergencies (“Doctor NRST,” January 2013 Flight Training). I would caution pilots on using their emergency pilot-in-command authority for sick passengers. Over a year and a half ago I was giving an introductory flight. The passenger in the back became airsick; her vomiting made the man up front with me ill as well. I was operating at a nontowered airport and, since there was no traffic, I elected to turn around and make a right base for landing. I did not interfere with any other aircraft.
Someone in the FBO heard me state “Right base” on the radio and turned me in to the local flight standards district office. The FSDO charged me with violating FAR 91.126. The FAA legal supported their position and informed me of certification action. The case will now go before an NTSB judge. Fortunately I have the AOPA legal services plan.
I read and liked Ian J. Twombly's “The Business of Flight Training” (“Right Seat,” January 2013 Flight Training). I own and operate a flight school—Alpine Flight Training in Eagle, Colorado. The column was refreshing in that it has been one of the few pieces I’ve seen recognizing that there is indeed another side to this story—the business side of making it all work. I believe, however, most people are still not entirely thinking through the problem.
In my opinion, flat-rate training is a bad proposition, but not for most of the reasons I read about. The main issue with flat-rate training is that there is no incentive for the student to work hard. I tried flat-rate training—it worked for some students (natural achievers) and it was a failure for others. In analyzing the results, my observation is that some students go home and read the books, study, and take the endeavor seriously. Others float along. The floaters get away with basically ripping off the flight school. Instead of having a private certificate at 40 to 60 hours, they end up finishing at 100 hours. At the start of the process we explain why we don’t do flat-rate training, then we share our stats—we show we have pilots who complete as low as 43 hours, and others who finish at 80 hours. The difference between the two costs is primarily within their control in terms of their willingness to study, prepare for lessons, and be fully engaged and invested in their goal. I think this is the side of the story that needs to be better communicated.
Loren French
Gypsum, Colorado
I hate to break it to you, but it’s not the money. General aviation is being killed by one thing and one thing only—the instructors. The FBOs usually are great, friendly, helpful and supportive. (I might put the antiquated training fleet as a distant second.) Almost all CFIs are totally unqualified to teach anything. They may be good pilots, but in terms of relating that information to a wide variety of students, they are woefully inadequate. Just imagine them in a private school setting; most wouldn’t last a year before being thrown out.
James Freund
Santa Rosa, California
Ian Twombly’s statement of simulation being the solution is not the best answer. His article on Redbird Skyport (“Big Idea,” January 2013 Flight Training) stated that the average aircraft hours for the private certificate is 42 hours. Not impressive given the unlimited usage of the Redbird sims. Simulators need to be very realistic with motion bases and wraparound visuals to provide a viable substitute for a real aircraft. This technology is not cheap. Even at Redbird it can approach $100,000, and the investment needs to be profitable for the owners who use them in leasebacks to the school or to the school itself.
Most flight school managers/owners have no expertise in financial matters and have no idea how to price revenue streams to realistically achieve positive cash flow over a viable return horizon. Aircraft and simulator leasebacks provide passive losses for tax purposes in most cases, and to properly recover the investment basis would result in rental rates much higher than currently charged in many markets.
Rental rates must be raised to cover the increase in asset technology costs. A realistic payback period would be three to five years. Accordingly, with a return on capital of only 8 percent, it would require at least $2,000 per month in revenue.
The suggestion to allow students unlimited access at no cost is a bad idea for the flight school or the sim owner. If the technology provides benefit, it should also provide revenue in proportion to its use.
Douglas Horn
Westerville, Ohio
Emergency or no?
I just finished reading Scott Olsen’s article on medical emergencies (“Doctor NRST,” January 2013 Flight Training). I would caution pilots on using their emergency pilot-in-command authority for sick passengers. Over a year and a half ago I was giving an introductory flight. The passenger in the back became airsick; her vomiting made the man up front with me ill as well. I was operating at a nontowered airport and, since there was no traffic, I elected to turn around and make a right base for landing. I did not interfere with any other aircraft.
Someone in the FBO heard me state “Right base” on the radio and turned me in to the local flight standards district office. The FSDO charged me with violating FAR 91.126. The FAA legal supported their position and informed me of certification action. The case will now go before an NTSB judge. Fortunately I have the AOPA legal services plan.