Accident Report /

The Mooney M20J single-engine airplane had been practicing takeoffs and landings for about a half-hour on a partial fuel load when shortly after the fourth takeoff, the engine quit. Too low to turn back or maneuver, the pilot—who had a passenger aboard—executed a straight-ahead forced landing, which resulted in the aircraft hitting a fence.

Aha, you think, you know where this is going. Here comes another sermon about a pilot running an airplane out of gas, followed by a writer reciting all the ways to avoid it, from doing better preflight planning to using proper means to measure a less-than-full fuel load.

Not this time.

The Mooney, which had flown from Lehigh Valley International Airport in Allentown, Pennsylvania, to nearby Queen City Municipal Airport for a practice session April 6, 2015, lost power with fuel in the tanks of both wings, and with the fuel selector set to the fuller side.

During the preflight, the 3,000-hour commercial pilot with 60 hours in the Mooney had estimated that the left fuel tank held about 25 gallons of fuel, and the right tank, seven or eight. So the fuel selector had been set to the left tank. The run-up had been normal.

“On the fourth takeoff, about 30 minutes into the flight, when the airplane reached an altitude about 400 to 500 feet above the runway, the engine quit. The pilot described the loss of power as an ‘instantaneous stop with no warning or sputtering.’ He then made a forced landing straight ahead and the airplane struck a wire-mesh fence that was supported with steel poles,” said the National Transportation Safety Board report. The occupants were uninjured.

The FAA looked over the aircraft about 30 minutes after the accident. “According to an inspector, the left and right wings sustained substantial damage and the nose gear had collapsed. The inspector did not see any fuel leaking from the airplane and the fuel selector was in the Off position.”

Further examination the next day “revealed there was about 4 to 5 gallons of fuel in the right tank and about 8 to 12 gallons of fuel in the left tank. The inspector disconnected the fuel line from the engine-driven fuel pump to the fuel servo and there was no fuel in the line. He then disconnected the fuel line that runs from the boost pump to the engine-driven fuel pump and when the boost pump was turned on, fuel came out in a pulsating spray indicative of air in the line.”

So, what was the probable cause of the interruption to the fuel flow? “The reason for the interruption of the fuel flow could not be determined during post-accident examination and testing,” concluded the NTSB.

An accident’s probable cause sometimes becomes inconclusive after the inquiry sidesteps a convenient—but incorrect—explanation.

Such was the case on April 15, 2015, when a Piper PA–28-140 lost power at low altitude after takeoff from Lancaster, New York, forcing the pilot to land straight ahead off-airport. The post-accident inspection revealed a known maintenance discrepancy that the pilot would have been unable to detect during preflight.

The Cherokee’s carburetor bowl was found to be loose—a condition subject to a service bulletin, and also undetectable during a preflight inspection. But that discovery didn’t answer the right questions after testing of the fuel system and examination of the spark plugs made it “unlikely that the carburetor’s condition contributed to the loss of engine power.”

“The reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined,” said the NTSB.

Most student pilots have had a flight instructor or two who, shortly after takeoff and before much altitude has been gained, inquires what the task-saturated trainee would do right now if the engine were to quit. Ideally the question instills in the new pilot several fastidious piloting habits. One is to always review before a flight the type of terrain that lies beyond the airport’s boundary; another habit to cultivate is to be sure to climb smartly after takeoff until a safe altitude is reached—either to allow a return (based on some experience with the aircraft’s performance in power-off, banked glides) or to reach the best off-airport emergency landing spot.

Accidents like these remind us that regardless of whether your aircraft’s engine quits instantaneously with no warning or coughs and surges first, there is always a takeoff or landing phase when continuing straight ahead is the only reasonable decision after a problem. Being ready to handle that moment, in any aircraft, using any runway you might choose to use, is what that wise instructor was training you to do.