Proficient Pilot: Decisions, Decisions

There are times, however, when using reduced thrust is not allowed, such as during wind-shear conditions or when the runway is contaminated with rain, snow, ice, or slush. A reduced-thrust takeoff increases takeoff distance, and runway contamination increases stopping distance (in case of an aborted takeoff). The combination of both reduced thrust and a contaminated runway could require more concrete than is available.

I recall taxiing in a Lockheed L–1011 at a snail’s pace in a long procession of aircraft toward the departure end of Runway 30L at St. Louis during the 1990s. My first officer was making the calculations needed to complete our takeoff performance chart. His attention alternated between the chart and the damp runway to our left, uncertain whether to use reduced thrust for takeoff. Looking in my direction, he asked, “I can’t figure it out. Should we use reduced or maximum thrust?”

I answered with a question: “What would you say at the hearing?”

Randy (not his real name) looked at me quizzically. “What are you talking about? What hearing?”

We were still at the tail end of the takeoff queue, so there was plenty of time for discussion.

“Let’s assume,” I began, “that we had an engine failure just before V₁ and had to abort the takeoff. Assume also that we didn’t stop within the confines of the runway and wound up burying the nosewheel in the dirt. The NTSB would conduct a hearing to investigate the incident. Right?”

“Of course,” he replied.

“One member of the inquisition undoubtedly would ask why reduced thrust was used when the runway was contaminated. We would reply that the runway was only damp, not really wet. He would then ask, ‘Do you mean that you thought you could stop just as quickly on a damp runway as when the surface is absolutely dry?’ Honesty would compel us to concede that any moisture on the runway adversely affects braking, and that we probably should not have used reduced thrust. The result could be a sizeable fine and time on the beach without pay.”

Randy returned to his work sheet and calculated our takeoff performance on the basis of using maximum thrust.

This method of aeronautical decision making can be applied to almost any operation about which a pilot might have doubt, including those involving general aviation. To make the right decision, all the pilot has to do is ask himself how he would explain his actions at the hearing. Could he justify his actions during such an investigation? If not, the decision was probably wrong.

Assume a pilot is flying into progressively deteriorating weather. The decision to continue is an ongoing process. If he envisions having to justify his decisions at a hearing, the pilot might decide earlier that conditions really do not warrant continuing the flight.

Another example involves a pilot running low on fuel. He believes he has enough fuel to reach his destination, but a growing and gnawing doubt makes him wonder if he should land short of his destination. Accident records are replete with the results of those who ignore such gut feelings and continue anyway. All such a pilot has to do is imagine the potential consequences and having to justify his actions at the hearing (and possibly to his Maker).

There are five hazardous attitudes most likely to result in our making poor decisions, and their antidotes are shown in parentheses:

• Antiauthority, the “don’t tell me” syndrome. (Follow the rules; they are usually right.)
• Impulsiveness, feeling the need to do something quickly. (Take your time; think before acting.)
• Invulnerability, believing that “it won’t happen to me.” (Acknowledge that it really can happen to you.)
• Machoism, the “I can do it” syndrome. (Don’t take chances unless you can afford the consequences.)
• Resignation, the “what’s the use?” syndrome. (You are never helpless; what you do can make a difference.)

Anticipate the questions that might be asked at a hearing so that you’ll never have to attend one.

Web: www.barryschiff.com