In October 2016, a chartered Boeing 737 carrying then-vice-presidential-candidate Mike Pence slid off a runway at New York’s LaGuardia Airport (LGA) after a long landing followed by delayed use of speed brakes and reverse thrust. The runway was wet, which further put the crew at a disadvantage. The event led to a lot of bad press for aviation and LaGuardia’s notoriously short runways.
So, what went wrong? First, no one likes to admit defeat and go around. And with high-profile passengers on board, the pressure increases. But this is LaGuardia. Pilots have to bring their A-game to this beehive of an airport designed for piston-powered airliners. Three runways end in Flushing Bay and the fourth—the one in the accident—on the Grand Central Parkway. This is not the airport to approach high, fast, or dithering around trying to get a squeaker of a landing.
According to the National Transportation Safety Board’s factual report, the 737 touched down 4,242 feet from the threshold of the 7,000-foot runway. Did the pilot flying float well beyond the touchdown zone trying for a greaser? A landing airliner will typically travel 250 feet for every second it floats. The late touchdown was further exacerbated by the delay for the speed brakes to deploy and seven seconds in getting the reversers deployed. Speed brakes/ground spoilers and reverse thrust are critical on a contaminated runway. Without spoilers, there’s very little weight on the wheels; hence, little to no braking ability. Regardless, the pilot should have gone around for another try.
This is just one of many similar incidents. A Flight Safety Foundation study over a 16-year period found that 83 percent of runway excursions could have been avoided had the crew elected to go around and try again. In response, many airlines and professional flight departments came up with stabilized approach criteria using altitude, speed, and configuration targets that must be met. For example, by 1,000 feet agl, the airplane should be in its final landing configuration, on the proper glidepath, and established on its approach speed. If not—go around. It sounds overly conservative, but the statistics reveal that pilots trying to salvage botched approaches in the final 1,000 feet greatly increase the chance of an accident.
Even with stabilized-approach policies in place, a paltry 3 percent of pilots performed a go-around following an unstable approach, according to the Flight Safety Foundation. Why? As noted earlier, pilots don’t like to admit defeat. We also are mission-oriented. Going around takes time, costs money, and makes us look bad. But, perhaps part of the problem is the fact that we rarely do go-arounds in the professional world. Other than required simulator training, it’s rare to do more than one actual go-around per year of flying. For long-haul pilots, it can be years between go-arounds.
When a go-around is self-induced, it’s not a surprise to the pilot who messed up the approach that he or she needs to try again. But when air traffic control orders an unexpected go-around, it can take pilots off guard. This happened to me recently when on an ILS approach to Newark’s Liberty International Airport in heavy rain. New York Approach handed us off to tower and as we passed through about 1,000 feet agl, we were ordered to go around. Quick! Recall and state all the callouts and configuration changes for the go-around. Set up the mode control panel with the assigned heading and altitude, et cetera. It’s a busy maneuver even with two pilots.
Student pilots might be shocked to hear that professional pilots have trouble with go-arounds. After all, students do them all the time. That being said, performing a go-around in a fixed-gear trainer is a pretty simple process compared to an airliner with flap-specific maneuvering speeds, required callouts, and a multitude of configuration changes. But yes, it’s true. At the professional level, go-arounds are so rare that you can watch some expert pilots turn into Jell-O when the time comes. Hence the focus on the maneuver during recurrent simulator training.
The Flight Safety Foundation study points out an obvious need for pilots to more seriously adhere to stabilized-approach criteria. The study’s conclusion states, “No other single decision can have such an impact in the reduction of aviation accidents as the decision to go around.”
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