Right Seat: Into the murk

Scott Hotaling’s cover story this month on flying from visual conditions to instrument conditions (called VFR into IMC) is a great primer on what happens when pilots continue into worsening conditions and why it should be avoided. You must identify a problem to beat a problem.

What Hotaling doesn’t cover is just how easy it is to get yourself into such a situation. You can declare you’d never be so dumb, and simply shrug off VFR into IMC as something that happens to people who are reckless and unprepared. Pilots who think such things are foolish, and generally too inexperienced to grasp how quickly and easily weather situations can change, and how easily we humans are sucked into poor decisions.

Like many pilots I’ve had my brushes with VFR into IMC, and ironically they happened after I received my instrument rating. Having an instrument rating can be dangerous in these cases. It’s like a good tool: Use it well and it will serve you well, but if you don’t pull it out when it’s needed, or apply it incorrectly, you’ll muck up the job.

In one instance of particular stupidity I pulled out the instrument rating at the right time and then put it away again, opting for brute force instead. Maryland’s Frederick Municipal Airport, where AOPA is based, is in a very busy area, and didn’t have a control tower at the time. You could get an IFR clearance and release on the ground, but it often took a lot of time to coordinate with the approach control facility.

It’s easy to look back and identify a mistake. It’s harder to be the one in the seat making the choice.On this day the weather was marginal VFR. Airplanes were using the traffic pattern but not departing the area without an IFR flight plan. I was trying to get about 50 miles away for a photo shoot, which meant I was in a hurry. I pulled up to the hold short line waiting to be released (when approach control says you can take off and be accepted into the IFR system). People were backing up behind me, I was waiting, and the appointment was getting closer.

Under this pressure I canceled the IFR clearance and took off. It took about three minutes to realize what a completely terrible decision that was. I climbed toward the clouds and entered some scud quickly. Then there was a series of turns and a descent—most of it controlled—in an attempt to exit, and then remain clear of the clouds. I made it 20 miles before landing at a nearby airport and taking stock of what had happened.

Many years later I recall clearly thinking during the ordeal that I knew exactly how precarious the situation was and how one poor decision led to what could have been an awful outcome. Sometimes the danger of VFR into IMC is that obvious, and sometimes it’s more a growing feeling that something isn’t quite right.

It’s easy to look back on accident reports and identify a mistake as being boneheaded and obvious. It’s harder to be the one in the seat making the choice when dozens of other factors are swirling around. Having the clarity of mind to recognize the risk and make the right choice is part of what weather decision making is all about. You can be a theoretical expert, but all the information in the world won’t help you if you don’t use it correctly.