Safety Spotlight: Turn and face the change

his was the war the F–15 was built for, and we had employed the airplane masterfully against an onslaught of “enemy.” Across the room, though, our squadronmates had not fared nearly as well. Red forces had snuck around them to harass the assets, and blue force losses were heavy.

The mood was somber. Leading the defeated blue force flight was a pilot who was an icon to me and squadron pilots of my generation. A veteran F–4 pilot of the Vietnam era, he represented what we, the new generation of fighter pilots, aspired to be: skilled, tough, dependable under pressure. This was a milestone moment. The arena this experienced fighter pilot dominated had changed and passed him by. Or more accurately, he had allowed it to pass him by.

That debrief was a seminal moment in my life, not just my aviation career. I watched with sadness as an icon defended a mindset and tactics that were made obsolete by new technologies and advanced capability. Clinging to old ways had resulted in an embarrassing performance for his flight. He seemed unable to accept and to recognize that the arena had changed.

By contrast, our flight lead, also an F–4 alumnus, embraced the new paradigm and adapted his vast experience to it. For the younger generation, no such adaptation was needed. We’d arrived in a pivotal era in the Cold War. U.S. Air Force leaders determined we would concede numerical superiority and defeat our adversaries through technical dominance and better training. We would defeat numbers by being better pilots in better aircraft. My generation of fighter pilots trained for scenarios where we expected to be outnumbered by four to one, or more. It was the only air warfare paradigm we knew. In adapting to the newer air warfare mindset, we had the law of primacy on our side, which holds that the first exposure to new material has greater influence on behavior than subsequent encounters with similar material. Good certificated flight instructors are well aware of the law of primacy, knowing it’s easier to develop and learn new skills and strategies than it is to adapt and modify old ones.

The crux of the issue in the air-to-air dogfighting arena was a redefining of “mutual support” and the latitude wingmen could (and should) exercise in aerial engagement. In the beginning of aerial warfare, wingmen had authority to shoot an adversary who was a threat to the flight lead, but otherwise, their initiative was curtailed. The status of wingmen is revealed in an old joke: “Hey, number two, the only things I want to hear out of you are: ‘two’ [a wingman’s acknowledgement of a flight lead order]; ‘Lead, you’re on fire’ [a wingman’s responsibility to tell lead if the lead aircraft has a problem]; and ‘Sir, may I buy you another drink?’”

The introduction of fourth-generation fighter aircraft and ceding substantial numerical superiority to the enemy mandated a change. Wingmen needed to have more latitude in offensive employment and more responsibility. To some in the older generation, this was tantamount to aerial anarchy. They predicted chaos, large numbers of friendly-on-friendly attrition, and gross misapplication of force. They were wrong. Their refusal to evolve resulted in their demise as effective leaders. The most successful in this era were the veterans who embraced new technologies and modified tactics based on their experience.

I sometimes see the same problem in general aviation. Recently, I was cornered by an experienced CFI grousing about new students and their fascination with the gizmo (he meant GPS). “I make them turn it off and we don’t fly with it,” he boasted. He also had a limited view of autopilots and aligning glass panel displays to optimize situational awareness on approaches. All he could see were the hazards, the potential distraction. Part of his aversion—so often the case—was because of unfamiliarity. He didn’t fully understand the equipment and had not taken the time to get effective training in the buttonology. The new technology intimidated him.

Giving wingmen too much authority could result in air-to-air chaos, and paying too much attention to new cockpit technology could result in dangerous distraction. But technology is one of the keys to the substantial and impressive advances we’ve made in GA safety. We must embrace new technologies and use our experience to fully adapt them into our modern flying. Our continuous march to be safer pilots demands this. Go fly.

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