While it seemed natural to follow last month’s discussion of landing accidents (see "Down to Earth," June 2011 Flight Training) with a quick analysis of accidents during airwork, this turned out to be harder than expected—not because the results are so complex, but because there’s next to nothing to analyze. Believe it or not, a quick review of accidents during primary instruction found none during the past five years that arose from loss of control while practicing steep turns, slow flight, or stalls—or ground reference maneuvers, for that matter—either solo or dual. (The one possible exception, a Texas crash in May 2010, is still under investigation.)
Even if they’re not completely reassured, students who are nervous about doing stalls should take some comfort from this. The minimum altitudes required for maneuver practice really do seem to provide reasonable margins of safety, and are generally respected by students and instructors alike.
Which is not to say that the instructor might as well go back to sleep while the student yanks and banks. There are pretty compelling reasons to keep your eyes open, particularly in a busy practice area. Midair collisions are very rare, but do seem to catch aircraft practicing maneuvers a little more often than you’d expect, perhaps once or twice a year. (Still more occur during instrument training, perhaps because two sets of eyes really are better than one.)
Of course, unintended stalls are another matter entirely, especially at low altitude. Most happen during takeoffs, landings, or go-arounds, when the instructor struggles to balance the natural desire to keep things under control with the educational imperative to let the student make mistakes. But a handful are caused by instructors themselves, typically in the context of emergency training. Two errors in particular have a way of turning simulated emergencies into the real thing. Pulling the throttle back on climb-out to simulate an engine failure is a dicey business; if the student is slow to react—likely! —airspeed will decay quickly, and an attempted turnback requires a sharp bank. Close to the ground, it’s an unforgiving combination. And neglecting to use carb heat (or make sure the student does) has turned more than one simulated engine failure in cruise into genuine forced landings, some more successful than others. If your students don’t like engine-out training, they may be on to something.