Ready for takeoff

The lethal reputation of the skidding base-to-final turn is entirely deserved. When crashes result, more than 80 percent are fatal. But they’re not as common as hangar talk might suggest. It may be partly a matter of exposure—most approaches don’t involve overshoots, while every flight includes a takeoff and most get as far as a landing—but far more airplanes get bent by stalls in circumstances that seem benign.

In 2017, the AOPA Air Safety Institute published an analysis of more than 2,000 accidents over a 15-year period that involved unintended stalls. Some of the results surprised readers and researchers alike. Half took place inside the traffic pattern, although not necessarily during pattern work: All takeoff and landing accidents, for example, are included regardless of the origins or destinations of the flights. And half of stall accidents in the pattern were ascribed to deficient technique during takeoff or the climb to altitude, the phases most pilots view as easiest.

What goes wrong

While a normal takeoff seems like a smooth, continuous process, it’s built up from distinct stages:

Lineup. Taxi onto the runway and turn the airplane to point down the centerline. If there’s a crosswind, deflect the ailerons into it. Make sure the engine gauges are in the green and the nosewheel is straight before opening the throttle.

Acceleration. Control authority increases as airspeed builds, so gradually relax some of the crosswind correction. Keep the elevator neutral, and use rudder pressure to stay on the centerline.

Rotation. After reaching the airspeed specified by the manufacturer, add just enough back-pressure to gently lift the nose wheel off the runway. Hold that pitch attitude until the main wheels lift off the ground.

Climb. Once the mains are free, pitch for VX (the airspeed giving the best angle of climb) until you’ve cleared any obstacles, then accelerate to VY to get the best rate of climb.

Most departure stalls result from one of two types of errors. The more common is trying to force the airplane to fly before it’s ready, without enough airspeed to climb out of ground effect. Increasing pitch attitude just slows the airplane more, putting it further behind the power curve. A smaller (and more dangerous) subset arises from efforts to achieve an unrealistically steep angle of climb after a successful liftoff. (ASI’s analysis found fatalities in fewer than 15 percent of accidents where the aircraft stalled less than 50 feet above ground level but more than two-thirds of those that broke above 100 feet. So, if you’re going to stall taking off, do it at as low an altitude as possible!)

Of course, details vary. A heavy aircraft and high density altitude can challenge even perfect technique, making lack of flight planning the underlying cause. Downwind and intersection departures don’t help, and the instinct to pull—provoked by the sight of onrushing obstructions—can overwhelm awareness of best-performance airspeeds. Pilots seeing the airplane get slower without climbing react by pulling even harder. And fixation on pitch attitude can come at the cost of directional control, especially among inexperienced aviators for whom the centerline remains a casual acquaintance.

Why do we stall?

Fixed-wing students are required to demonstrate recognition and avoidance of impending stalls before they’re endorsed to fly solo. Stall awareness and recovery techniques are tested on checkrides and flight reviews throughout their subsequent flying careers. Why doesn’t this prevent more of these highly avoidable crashes?

Lack of recurrent practice among certificated pilots is almost certainly a factor. One or two stall entries during flight reviews can’t be expected to carry through all the outings in between. But a more fundamental reason is that the precautions necessary to practice stalls safely in an airplane make that practice a poor simulation of typical accident conditions. Climbing thousands of feet before slowing to rotation speed, then adding power and pitching up with nothing zooming at the nose doesn’t replicate the sense of urgency triggered by sluggish acceleration on an obstructed runway. Little wonder it doesn’t automatically produce the correct response.

What examiners see

You’d think that if a pilot ever did something correctly, it would be during a checkride, right? So, if designated pilot examiners (DPEs) see a disconnect between stall training and the situations that produce real-world stall accidents, their perspective probably merits some respect.

Bob Gawler served as a DPE for more than 25 years, retiring six months before qualifying for membership in the United Flying Octogenarians. He has administered about 2,300 practical tests for various fixed-wing ratings, involving some 3,000 hours of oral examination and another 3,000 in the cockpit. He’s still an active flight instructor in the Washington, D.C., area, where he’s taught since 1983. Those experiences have left him with few illusions about the way many CFIs—especially low-time instructors at schools with rapid turnover—approach the task of teaching stall recognition and recovery.

Power-on stall practice is meant to help pilots recognize and recover from an accidental stall developing during takeoff or climb. “Too many candidates try to be lawn darts,” he said. “They’ll pull the yoke all the way back, trying to pitch the nose straight up,” rather than using increasing back-pressure to hold a plausible nose-high attitude as the airspeed bleeds off. “Then, when the stall does break, their recovery technique is anything other than that mandated by the handbook—lawn darts again. They’ll shove the nose all the way down rather than lowering it just below the horizon to regain airspeed.” Of course, the resulting rapid acceleration can prompt an equally abrupt pullout, with the consequent risk of a secondary stall.

This may reflect a view of the airman certification standards (ACS) as a series of unrelated boxes to be checked off rather than facets of a comprehensive education. Gawler notes ruefully that many of these candidates came from CFIs he himself had trained, “so they used to know how to do it correctly—but picked up bad habits somewhere.” The revised standard for slow flight in the new Private Pilot ACS may have also confused the issue by discouraging “flying around with the [stall warning] horn blaring,” thus depriving students of the physical sense of how the airplane handles in an imminent stall.

What you can do

Technology can help—but an Aeronca Champ with minimal instrumentation and no electrical system provides an ample margin of safety to pilots who practice appropriate flight planning, rigorous airspeed control, and good coordination. Willingness to abort early doesn’t hurt, either. Neither does regular practice.

Planning. If weight, weather, and runway length all meet standards you’ve already proven sufficient, detailed performance calculations aren’t necessary. But if something’s changed for the worse or there’s any other reason for doubt, five minutes with the POH beats five hours with the FAA (or NTSB). “I think I can” doesn’t even work with trains.

Airspeed. Knowing the runway is long enough should help overcome that urge to pull harder as it disappears beneath you. You can’t climb more steeply than at VX, so know it and nail it.

Rudder. Eliminating yaw doesn’t just prevent spins; it maximizes aerodynamic efficiency when you need it most. Incorporate quick glances at the ball until you learn to feel whether it’s centered.

Stop! One rule of thumb calls for aborting the takeoff if you haven’t reached half of rotation speed in the first third of the runway. Running off the end of the runway with decreasing energy is always preferable to stalling at low altitude.

Technology. If you have access to a simulator that convincingly re-creates the airplane you usually fly, program marginal takeoff conditions. Use them to develop the discipline described above and to learn to recognize when things aren’t going well.

If your favorite airplane has an angle-of-attack indicator—or you’re thinking of installing one—learn what it’s really telling you. Most aftermarket installations rely on a probe on one wing, which won’t always be the one with the higher AOA. Build in a suitable margin for error.

Practice. Rather than only forcing stalls with full breaks, also concentrate on learning how to recognize the early sensory cues and lowering the nose just enough to rapidly build airspeed.

And don’t be intimidated. Light airplanes make perhaps 30 million takeoffs a year. Thirty to 35 are cut short by stalls. Your share of them should—and can—be zero.

David Jack Kenny is a fixed-wing ATP with commercial privileges for helicopters. He was the AOPA Air Safety Institute’s statistician from 2008 through 2017 and the author of its report on accidents involving stalls.